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REFLECTION
I.

PARTS OF A LANDSCAPE

In this paper, I want to offer some observations about the way actors
in the legal system make decisions. I shall draw attention to some of the
many complexities of legal decision-making, criticize some of the research
on the subject which has been conducted in recent years, and conclude with
an account of some of my empirical work on an aspect of parole board
decision-making which is intended to illustrate some of the points in my
argument.
My paper proposes some of the central concerns which theoretical and
empirical explorations into decision-making in legal settings should address.
Its argument is that there exists only a rather imperfect understanding of the
ways in which legal discretion' is exercised, and this is substantially due to
the poverty in method and conception of much of the existing research;
indeed, much of the literature seems not to have even clarified the conceptual
terrain before beginning building work. The result of this is a simplistic
image of the nature of decision behavior. This paper argues for more
naturalistic study of the processes of law to develop an empirically-based
understanding of how and why legal decisions are made in certain ways in
routine cases. I am not, therefore, concerned with the development of a
normative theory.
The business of law is the business of making decisions. Decisions are
made at every step of the legal process, though obviously some are weightier,
more consequential for the individual, than others. Perhaps for the layman
"the law" is personified by the judge (note the significance of the word)
presiding over the public ceremonies of the courtroom and delivering a
judgment on the rival claims in a civil case, or by the jury's verdict in a
criminal case. Similarly, much of the raw material of traditional legal
scholarship consists of the reports of the decisions of judges and their
supporting rationales, which together comprise a legal "case. ' 2 But the
layman's picture of the law (if it is accurately described) is distorted. Judges
1. I use the terms "discretion," "decision-making," "decision behavior," and "judgment" synonymously, in the interests of the reader rather than of scholarly accuracy.
2. However, I use the term "case" in a different way, to refer to the building up of
knowledge and information about a person's involvement in the civil or criminal law-about a
claim for damages, for example, or about alleged involvement in criminal behavior-which may
then be handled, referred on, filed away, or decided about. At any rate, such a case takes on
real and concrete qualities for those who must deal with it.
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are clearly significant figures and judicial decisions are of central importance
to legal work-even if precisely how and in what circumstances they are
important are not well understood. Yet judges are only one kind of legal
actor, and their judgments only one kind of a vast array of legal decisions
which are made in modern industrialized welfare states. Robert Kagan has
made the point well: 3
The great mass of official decisions in the legal system of the modern
welfare-regulatory state are not made by judges, after considering
the arguments of legal counsel, but by "eligibility workers" processing files in welfare and unemployment insurance offices, or by lowpaid regulatory inspectors, tax auditors, licensing officials and assorted other bureaucrats. In theory, of course their decisions are
subject to review by courts; but in practice appeal often is unfeasible.
The law, as applied, thus is a product of "the bureaucracy"....
I interpret the term "legal decision-making," then, in a very broad way
to include a variety of decisions made by individuals and groups involved in
legal processes. A variety of illustrations could be marshalled to suggest that
decision-making is an immensely complex matter, though examples used here
will be drawn primarily from the criminal justice process because it has
produced the largest number of studies which illuminate the problem. This,
and the use of criminal law to implement regulatory policy, have been the
areas in which my own work has been concentrated. Accordingly, I shall
draw, explicitly or implicitly, on research on aspects of the decision behavior
of a variety of legal actors, in particular regulatory officials (water pollution
control officers), enforcing rules carrying a criminal sanction; 4 and members
of American state parole boards.' My remarks may well, however, be relevant
to many aspects of the less-researched arenas of civil legal processes.
Why is it worth studying how legal actors make decisions? It is a
commonplace that the law in action frequently bears little resemblance to
the structure of rules found in statute and precedent, but what is the precise
nature of the mechanism by which this occurs? It is in the everyday
discretionary behavior of police officials, lawyers, judges, and others that
the legal system takes shape and gets things done. The abstract and often
terse statements of the legislature are given form and purpose in the choices
legal actors make about the reach and meaning of their conception of the
law. The making of decisions is an all-pervading feature of human activity,
with consequences which are sometimes trivial or banal, sometimes drastic
or dramatic. A concern for the making of decisions by legal actors is
important because law is the most consequential normative system in a

3. R. Kagan, Book Review, Inside Administrative Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 816 (1984).
4. K. HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984).

5. K. Hawkins, Assessing Evil: Decision Behavior and Parole Board Justice, 23 BRIT.
OF CRIMINOLOGY

101 (1983).

J.
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society. "The law provides the general framework within which social life
6
takes place," writes Raz:
It is a system for guiding behaviour and for settling disputes which
claims supreme authority to interfere with any kind of activity. It
also regularly either supports or restricts the creation and practice
of other norms in society. By making these claims the law claims to
provide the general framework for the conduct of all aspects of
social life and sets itself up as the supreme guardian of society.
The significance of decision behavior in the translation of legal rules
into action is self-evident. It is difficult to imagine many occasions when
legal rules are mechanically applied; at every stage in the legal process choices
are made by actors: litigants, accused persons, lawyers, enforcement officials,
judges, penal practitioners, and so on. The creation of any legal "case" and
its subsequent career are shaped by decisions made in a dynamic unfolding
process. Cases flow through the various handling systems employed in legal
processes, their courses shifting or terminating at various salient decision
points. Furthermore, few cases in proportion to the numbers theoretically
eligible are dealt with visibly in the court room, the forum presumably
intended to be the site for formal legal decisions by judges about their
ultimate disposal. Instead, this decision-making tends for the most part to
be done in informal settings characterized by a high degree of privacy. Thus
although judges play a key role in making decisions in a formal setting
(decisions which may of course acquire, through the authority of precedent,
a significance outside themselves in the higher courts if a rule is being
clarified or modified), other crucial decisions are made, largely invisibly, by
officials and legal practitioners whose primary concerns are bound up with
the handling and management of a stream of cases seen in interactional and
organizational contexts.
Legal decisions are, of course, potentially weighty matters for the
participants in the process, especially suspects, defendants, and litigants. In
the criminal process the judgments of enforcement and prosecution officials
effectively serve as screening devices sorting out which cases are worth
prosecuting and with what charge.7 In the civil law, claims in, say, tort or
contract are handled in analogous fashion, though here possibly more
extensive screening is effected by sometimes lengthy negotiations to settle
out of court.' The civil case which reaches formal adjudication in the
courtroom is statistically highly exceptional.
Decision-making, in short, is the stuff of the law. Discretion enables
legal rules and mandates to be interpreted and given purpose and form. It
enables judgments to be made about the application, reach, and impact of
the law. And it enables the conflicting imperatives of consistency and
individualization to be reconciled.
6. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 120-121 (1979).
7. See, e.g., D. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE (1980); M. Myers &
J. Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutorsand the Allocation of Court Resources, 26
Soc. PROBS. 439 (1979).
8. See, e.g., L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT (1970); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
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On Form and Structure in Legal Decisions
My purpose here is . to draw attention to aspects of the richness and
diversity of various kinds of legal decision and to clarify a little of the
vocabulary of legal decision-making. This is important because there is not
only an impressive range in the types and numbers of legal officials who
actually make decisions, but diversity as well in the form of such decisions
and the settings in which they occur, with significant implications for the
kinds of decisions made. Indeed, the term "legal decision-making" covers
an enormous range of activities, from the studied judgment, the ceremony
and solemnity of the judge in the courtroom, to the often hasty (and usually
unceremonious) decision of a policeman on the street about how to deal
with a suspect. Bear in mind also that the homogeneity of the decisions made
by legal actors varies widely. Some enjoy a broad range of substantive choice
as to the precise nature of any decision made. Policing, for example, is well
known for the decisions of a social work, order-maintenance, or peacekeeping
kind, as well as the more familiar judgments about arrest. 9 And police
officers, of course, like other gatekeeping officials controlling access to the
legal system, have the power to decide to do nothing.' 0 In contrast, the kinds
of decisions made by other sorts of legal actors-the members of a parole
board, for instance-may be very much more homogeneous. In the case of
parole boards, their task is much more narrowly framed in terms of having
essentially to decide whether to release a prisoner before expiration of
sentence or not, or whether to recall a parolee to prison. In short, the ways
in which decisions are made and the outcomes of any decisions made may
be heavily influenced by precise matters of structure, form, and personnel
in legal decisions.
It is important to be clear about the terms and concepts used in this
analysis. To begin with, the word "decision" refers to the outcome of
deciding, while the term "decision-making" speaks to the process of making
up a mind. Much of the literature on decision-making tends to regard legal
decisions as judgments made at particular salient points in the civil or
criminal-justice systems as cases flow through them." Decisions about arrest,
charge, plea, and guilt, for instance, are examples of such salient points in
the criminal-justice process. However, if we are to develop an understanding
of how legal decisions are actually made, it is important to regard them as
constituent parts of a continuous process which seamlessly connects one
salient decision point with the next. Indeed, the process itself consists of an
almost infinite number of complex decisions of greater or lesser significance
about the handling or processing of a case between these salient decision
points. Furthermore, some of these ancillary decisions, though less visible,
may have significant consequences. For example, if the single judge in the
English legal system who sits to determine whether a convicted offender is
9. E.g., J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968).
10. See, e.g., 1. Piliavin & S. Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J. OF Soc.
206 (1964); K. Hawkins, Creating Cases in a Regulatory Agency 12 URB. LIFE 371 (1984).
11. See, e.g., D. GOTTFREDSON & M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION-MAKING IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (1980).
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to be granted leave to appeal against sentence or not decides against that
offender, that decision puts an end to the matter, and the Court of Appeal,
of two or three judges will not hear the case.
A distinction needs to be made, then, in analyzing legal decisions between
primary, or first-order, decisions and secondary, or second-order, decisions.
Primary decisions are those visible, salient or significant decisions which
comprise the key decision points in the career of a legal case, addressing the
handling or disposal of that case, or changing the status of the person caught
up in the process. Thus, decisions to arrest or not, prosecute or not, convict
or not may be regarded as primary decisions. Secondary decisions would be
comprised of those various ancillary decisions made in the course of handling
or disposing of any case: What security classification should be imposed on
this prisoner? Should the prisoner go to a secure or an open institution?
Many second-order decisions may not seem to be particularly significant,
such as what information should be included as part of the raw material of
a case, but they may have enormous implications for how subsequent primary
decisions are made. Such secondary decisions are virtually endless in both
kind and number. They tend also to be made in private and not at more
visible points in the system; instead many of them tend to come together in
a process of accretion as a mosaic of supplementary handling decisions.
The concept of decision implies the existence of information; and it
implies a choice, for if there were no choice, how could it be said that there
was a decision? Accordingly, in referring to the making of a decision I have
in mind the question of choice as to action which is exercised by the wide
variety of legal actors, who, at various points in legal processes, exercise a
choice to do otherwise. The notion of choice is variable. It may be in many
cases very wide and very real but in other circumstances it may be much
more apparent than real, automatic almost, rather than creative, because a
"decision" made merely reflects one or more other decisions already reached
earlier in the civil or criminal justice handling systems in the processing of
the case. In other words, it is important to distinguish the concept of deciding
from the concept of ratifying. In some forms of legal decision-making those
who supply information, opinion, or assessment may have such an enormous
influence on the decisions subsequently made about the handling of a case
that it becomes difficult to conceive of the salient decision point as being
the one at which a real choice was made.' 2 For example, "If a [life] prisoner
had the backing of C5 [the section in the Home Office in London responsible
for collating and summarizing all the information about the handling of
such cases], he was almost certain to be released. During the period analysed,
C5 gave positive suggestions for the release of 71 men and these were
accepted by the [Parole] Board in 70 cases."' 3 It is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the real decisions in this example are, with very few exceptions, made with the framing of the "suggestions" put forward by the Home

Office. '4
12. K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
13: M. Maguire, F. Pinter & C. Collis, Dangerousness and the Tariff, 24 BRIT. J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1984).
14. Similarly, in a pilot study of 250 parole applicants it was found that the Pennsylvania

19861

LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

1167

The use of language in documentary reports may or may not reveal
where the real or effective source of authority or influence in the making of
a decision actually resides. Doubtless in certain circumstances the effective
source of decision authority is obscured. Formal accounts of decision practices are sometimes conspicuously careful in their use of language to convey
the impression of the exercise of a discretion which may be more apparent
than real. In some forms of legal decision, for example, people supplying
information are requested or encouraged to make a "recommendation" to
those in whom decision-making authority is formally located, though less
assertive language may sometimes be employed. For example, in the paroling
of life-sentence prisoners in England and Wales the judiciary are "consulted"
by the Home Secretary for "an initial judicial view ... as to the period of
years to be served," a form of input to the decision subsequently described
as "advice.""s It may safely be assumed that such "advice" carries considerable weight.
Decisions are made, then, about the kind and amount of information to
supply the maker of a first-order decision where that decision is made on
the basis, inter alia, of documentary information; the nature of such data,
which becomes the raw material for decision by legal actors, may vary
enormously. Data may exist in the form of written statements, reports or
accounts, or in the form of a real person. Another much more diffused form
of data resides in the institutional memory possessed by officials in organizations about normal ways of handling matters.' 6 Data used to make a
decision may be "raw," or processed on one or more occasions; it may be
overlaid in various ways such that a record may be composed; or it may
accumulate by accretion, as in a parole dossier or the many other records
and files written by various officials at various points in time. Different
people may have a different orientation to the data, the person, and the
decision at that time, thereby transforming the nature of the reality reported
on. Creating a file on a case involves in effect the selective social reconstruction of history.' 7 Data which exist in written form are readily reproducible
and transmissible to others and exist as a record where they may be stored,
classified, and retrieved as circumstances demand. Such data often acquire
a particular authority as well as a persistence and permanence in case files,
which sometimes are overburdened by the accumulated detritus of years past.
However, other data for legal decisions in certain circumstances may be
much more ephemeral (though nonetheless influential), consisting of oral
statements by individuals, or in many cases non-verbal cues-the sort of
data which research has shown to play a central part, for example, in the
Board of Parole agreed with the recommendation made by the Board's Parole Interviewer in
98 01 of the cases. See J. Carroll, R. Wiener, D. Coates, J. Galegher, & J. Alibrio, Evaluation,
Diagnosis and Prediction in Parole Decision Making, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 199 (1982).
15. REPORT OF THE PAROLE BOARD FOR ENGLAND AND WALES FOR 1983 at 2 (1984).
16. D. Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965).
17. See, e.g., D. NELKEN, THE LIMITS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS: A STUDY OF LANDLORDS,
LAW AND CRIME (1983).
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decision to arrest a suspect or not. A number of research studies 8 have
shown how police officers respond to non-verbal cues such as dress, demeanor and symbols of toughness or aggression, in deciding whether and
how to invoke the criminal process.
Whatever the nature of the data for decision, however, a crucially
important feature is the source of those data. The identity or status of a
person offering an evaluation or assessment to a decision-maker, or the
character of a witness in a trial, may be extremely influential, and in a
conflict of evidence may prompt a series of common-sense assessments about
the credibility or otherwise of an individual, whether suspect, witness, or
claimant, caught up in the arms of the law.
(i) Forms of legal decision
Our stereotypical public image of legal decision-making as symbolized
by the judge handing down a judgment or sentence as the culmination of
the ceremony of the courtroom reflects a conception of legal decisions as a
matter of adjudication. However, the great bulk of what I am treating as
legal decisions are not solemn adjudications by judges, 9 but are decisions
made by lesser and less visible, individuals: lawyers, policemen, probation
officers or other social workers, or a host of administrative officials in
regulatory bureaucracies. The decisions made here are not usually the product
of adjudication, but of negotiation.
The formal law in the Anglo-American tradition seems to contemplate
a legal case as a matter to be settled by adjudication and as constituted by
two parties, a claimant and a defendant in a civil case, or the state and the
accused in a criminal case. In both settings, the problem of the competing
claims is resolved at trial by the judge (and where appropriate, the jury)
acting as the third party whose decision is binding upon the other two. The
essence of legal decision-making by adjudication, then, is the existence of an
authoritative third individual or group empowered to make a decision binding
upon the two competing parties, and its defining feature is the imposition
of a solution to a problem defined in adversarial terms, in contrasting ways.20
The parties contribute to the adjudicated decision, but do not take part in
the process of deciding itself; "they seek", as Gulliver puts it, "to affect
the judgment in their own interests, but they do not participate in the
decision-making." ' 2' Adjudication works because there is an overriding au-

18. E.g., I. Piliavin & S. Briar, supra note 10; C. Werthman & I. Piliavin, Gang Members
and the Police, in D. BORDUA (ed.), THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL EssAYs 56 (1967); D.
Black, supra note 7.
19. Unless it is clear from the context, Iuse the term "judge" to refer to all such officials
who adjudicate in trials, including magistrates.
20. 1 am indebted to V. Aubert, IN SEARCH OF LAW (1984) and P. Gulliver, Case Studies
of Law in Non-Western Societies, in L. NADER (ed.), LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 11 (1969)
in this part of the discussion.
21. Gulliver, supra note 20, at 18.
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thority to decide. A decision is imposed, an outcome which tends to be cast
in categorical binary terms (guilty or not guilty, liable or not liable).
Authority is a crucial ingredient in adjudication since the binary outcome
(win-all or lose-all) presumably means that the party who loses the case
would be otherwise unwilling to accept the verdict. Since adjudicated decisions are in effect all or nothing, it is often possible to predict with some
degree of accuracy which is the more likely outcome: guilty or not guilty,
liable or not liable. 22 In legal and indeed in many other social settings the
processes of adjudication are often attended with considerable formality and
ceremony, presumably to endorse the independence and authority of the
adjudicating individual or panel.
Arbitration may be regarded as a sub-species of adjudication to the
extent that it is a device permitting an arbitrator to choose between the
competing claims of two parties. Two key differences between adjudication
and arbitration, however, are that the arbitrator may provide an answer to
a question which represents a compromise between the competing claims,
and an answer which need not necessarily be binding on the parties.
In contrast with adjudicated decisions, negotiation is a means of solving
problems arrived at in the absence of an authoritative, imposed outcome. It
is a flexible system of decision-making relying upon bargaining, and to that
extent the agreed outcome is tolerable to both sides.2? Negotiation works in
the absence of an authoritative decision-maker because there is at least a
measure of consensus and commitment to the outcome of the decisionmaking process felt by both parties. 24 They must be "in agreement with it",
in Gulliver's words, "and must accept it as the best that can be obtained in
the circumstances. Acceptance is by compulsion, of course, but it is the
compulsion exercised by the other party and not by overriding external
authority.'"'2 It is decision-making by compromise rather than by the imposition of one verdict or another. There is no fully authoritative party (though
of course bargaining strengths may well differ between the parties), thus the
complete acquiescence of one side or the other in an all-or-nothing outcome
is unusual. To the extent that each side enjoys at least some measure of
bargaining strength, the negotiated decision is mutually arrived at, not
imposed, giving negotiation the character of a search for a solution to a
problem (where the character of adjudication tends to be that of finding an
answer to a question). This search takes place in informal settings which are
unencumbered with a structure of formal rules and procedures, in contrast
26
with adjudication, for there is no authority to decide which norms apply.

22.
if parties
in a civil
23.
24.
25.

1 would not wish to give too much emphasis to such predictions, however. Presumably,
enjoyed a high degree of certainty about the likely outcome of any formal adjudication
case, such an adjudication would not be needed in the first place.
P. Gulliver, supra note 20, at 17.
K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
P. Gulliver, supra note 20, at 18.

26. Id.
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Mediation is a form of decision-making closely allied with negotiation,
in the sense that it is a means of facilitating the striking of a bargain between
the competing parties. The bargain is reached through the good offices of a
non-authoritative third party.
If negotiation is characterized by informality of procedure, adjudication
is closely tied to notions of legal formality. In systems of legal decisionmaking surrounded by formality, a structure of rules operates to create a
measure of predictability. That is to say, the outcome of a decision process
may be logically deduced by the rational consideration of the facts of the
case and the application of relevant rules: "The problem has become
objective in the sense that a solution can be reached by an outsider who
knows the rules of evidence and is able to perform logical manipulations
27
within a normative structure.
In decision-making by negotiation, in contrast, "a solution to an interest
conflict that is based on the reciprocal adjustment of needs," Aubert says,
"is ill-suited to the promotion of predictability." 2 It might be more apt to
use the term "less suited" in this statement, however, because regularities
are discernible in the behavior of those who make decisions to settle problems
or to process cases in the informal and quite private settings in which most
legal negotiations take place. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage how pleabargaining, as portrayed, for example, by David Sudnow, 29 could operate
effectively in the absence of a high degree of familiarity between defense
and prosecution lawyers about how each regards certain forms of offense
and offender.
Formal, legal-adjudicated-decisions are also bound up with publicity.
Adjudicators' decisions in law are sometimes made in the public ceremony
of the courtroom. And where they are made privately (by a parole board or
a tribunal, for example), their results are often available to the public.
Judicial and some administrative decisions are also made ostensibly within
the structure of publicly known substantive and procedural rules, and there
are usually arrangements for accountability, with provisions for appeal or
review of cases. Negotiated decisions, however, characterized as they are by
informality, tend to be made in private, with a low degree of visibility of
process and result. They tend also to be made in accordance with few publicly
known substantive or procedural rules, though there may well be various
other kinds of rules in evidence, such as the norm of reciprocity.30 In effect,
decision-making by negotiation does not necessarily owe a heavy debt to the
past, whereas, according to Aubert, formal legal processes are prisoners of
their past in the sense that "in the mutual adjustment of needs" which
characterizes informal negotiated decision processes, "what has been said or

27. V. Aubert, supra note 17, at 69.
28. Id. at 70.
29. D. Sudnow, supra note 16.
30. A. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity-A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. Soc.
52 (1960).
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done before can be left unsettled if it suits the parties." The parties "can
often (but not always) disregard the precedent implications of the settlement." Thus "a bargain struck leaves no mark upon the normative order;
it is not a consequence of it nor does it become a constituent part of it."'"
It might be added that informality of process is associated with invisible
decision practices, whose existence is often not recorded, and whose potential
for becoming public and therefore creating the possibility of a record-a
past-is extremely limited.
The discussion up to this point has been focussed upon decision-making
in particular cases, which will remain the primary concern of this essay. It
should be noted, however, that a significant part of legal decision-making is
of another kind, and is not addressed to case decision-making at all, that is,
the question of how to dispose of a discrete and concrete individual case.
Instead, decision-makers are often concerned with the making of policy, in
other words making decisions about how to decide particular classes of case.
Policy decision-making assumes considerable importance in public law, where
legal rules are implemented by "street-level bureaucrats ' 3 2 who are members
of formal organizations. This is not to deny that case decision-making is
also a form of policy-making, as Lipsky has argued, 3 a form which may be
regarded as emerging from the aggregated use of discretion in individual
cases and made possible by a relatively high level of discretion and autonomy
in the organization. The point is that very often the environment of a legal
decision, so far as the official is concerned, is partly made up of existing decisions which comprise a policy purporting to inform the handling of particular
kinds of case in particular ways. Thus the discretion of individual police officers may be shaped in particular instances by the fact that they are involved
in a crackdown against a particular form of offense.
(ii) Location of decision-making authority
Another aspect of the diversity of legal decision is to be found in the
variations in the location of legal authority to make decisions. The number
and the kind of decision-makers vary in different legal settings. Some decision
processes may be helpfully looked at as a sequence of choices made in series,
one following another. In these circumstances, matters such as the flow of
information from one point in the system to a subsequent point, or the
status or credibility of the source of a piece of information, become particularly important. There may well be various kinds of connection between
decisions about the handling of a case over time, with subsequent decisions
made in such a way as to amplify or correct earlier decisions. Put another
way, a decision made in a certain way can affect the way in which a
subsequent decision is made. This may be the explanation, for example, of

31. V. Aubert, supra note 20, at 70.
32. M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:
SERVICES (1980).
33. Id. at 13 ff.
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the finding that prisoners with existing records of institutional misconduct
are more likely to be reported for subsequent rule violations than those
without such records,3 4 or the finding that a substantial proportion of people
detained in custody awaiting trial are not subsequently sentenced to a
custodial term upon conviction 3 5 Sometimes, in addition, it is useful to
consider some sorts of decisions as being made in parallel to the extent that
a particular outcome is reached by a number of decision-makers acting
together. This is the case when, for example, a decision is to be made by a
tribunal, a panel of judges, a jury, or members of a parole board. What
assumes significance here is the fact that decisions by individuals have to be
molded in social interaction into one judgment or verdict purporting to
represent the (in reality often differing) views of the constituent members.
Some decisions are made by apparently single decision-makers such as
the police officer on the street, or the sentencing judge. The phrase "apparently single" is important because effective decision-making authority does
not usually reside solely in one particular spot, but is diffused among
information suppliers and colleagues whose ostensible role is to service the
decision-makers, like probation officers with their presentence enquiries. For
instance, there can be few cases where the single decision-maker actually
makes a decision alone, devoid of knowledge contributed by others, without
a stock of information about individual, event, and relevant history, which
together make up a legal "case." The police officer is probably the most
familiar example of an individual decision-maker who occasionally has to
make swift decisions about whether to proceed with suspects apparently
unaffected by the discretionary work of others, but even here such decisions
may well be affected by departmental policy of one sort or another.16 Note
also that a seemingly spontaneous or isolated decision is still informed by
informal decision rules operating as part of the legal actors' occupational
cultures which grow by accretion from routine practices over time. Judges,
on the other hand, not only make their sentencing decisions in conjunction
with written materials, they also have the benefit of sometimes lengthy oral
proceedings in the courtroom (some of which are, of course, specifically
intended to affect the exercise of judicial discretion).
Many legal decisions are made by a number of discrete individuals who
comprise panels of decision-makers, of which appeal courts, juries, tribunals,
and parole boards are all examples. In these settings, where final decisions
are made in parallel, there is not only a flow of information to each decisionmaker but also the possibility of a variety of interactional effects between
them which need to be addressed. Panels are, of course, expressly designed
in recognition of the principle that "two (or three, or five, or twelve) heads
are better than one." Where decisions have binary outcomes (such as the

34.
A Study
35.
36.

E. Poole & R. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule Breaking, and Disciplinary Response:
of Discretionary Decision Making in Prison, 14 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 931 (1980).
See, e.g., D. Gottfredson & M. Gottfredson, supra note 11, at 102.
See, e.g., I. Piliavin & S. Briar, supra note 10.
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jury's guilty/not guilty verdict), personal interaction between decision-makers
assumes central importance in cases where people come individually to
different conclusions about the right decision. Unless decision by majority is
an approved practice (as is the case with appellate courts or the jury or the
parole board in some jurisdictions), these different verdicts have to be
negotiated so that only one outcome, purporting to represent the collective
view of the membership, is produced. (And even though there is scope for
majority verdicts in some settings, it may well be the case-it certainly is
among some parole boards-that voting is preceded by some attempt to
negotiate a seemingly unanimous outcome if possible.)
Of course the authority to decide is dependent upon the structure of the
legal system itself and the extent to which rules may formally confer
discretion upon or limit the discretion of legal actors. A wide authority to
decide may arise from explicit delegation of authority or the absence of a
rule prohibiting action. Lawyers, indeed, may conceive of a part of a legal
system without rules as one of "absolute discretion, ' 37 but from a sociological point of view this does not necessarily make sense since the sociologist
will see discretion as shaped by a variety of constraints, human, organizational, or economic, operating beyond legal rules. One familiar legal form,
for example, is explicitly organized, when legislatures are unwilling or unable
to make specific choices, to provide for a large amount of discretionary
leeway to be allocated to administrative officials, and the exercise of discretion here is (presumably) largely uninformed by legal rules. In regulatory
systems of legal control which employ the criminal sanction to cope with the
unfortunate and undesired consequences of industrialization, legislatures are
often unwilling or unable to be specific about the precise nature of the social
or economic ills which they wish to control, the degree of control which they
wish to be exerted, or precisely how the costs and burdens involved are to
be borne. Instead they leave the precise formulation of administrative rules
and standards to officials who are allocated substantial discretion both to
make policy and to enforce that policy, because the legislature does not want
to contemplate the complexities of particular case decisions (though another
view would be that this form of law is employed because it is not in the
interests of powerful groups that matters relevant to such decisions are
crystallized and made specific).18 In penal law also, wide discretion is often
granted to judges, probation and parole officials and others, by legislatures
which prefer to fudge or to remain silent on some of the thorny perennial
problems of penal policy. This is particularly true of the position in England.
"The silence of the statutes is deliberate," Nigel Walker has said. "Legislators who want Parliament's assent to a new type of sentence are well advised
not to specify its objective, but instead to leave members [and, Walker might
have added, those who have to implement the legislation] free to interpret it

37. See, e.g., J. Raz, supra note 6.

38. See, e.g., A. Hopkins & N. Parnell, Why Coal Mine Safety Regulations in Australia
Are Not Enforced, 12 INT'L J. OF THE Soc. oF L. 179 (1984).
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according to their individual philosophies.
Nothing divides a committee like
' 39
a discussion of the aims of punishment.
While regulatory law may typically embody a somewhat vague statement
of the broad objective of the legislation, and society relies upon the expert
exercise of discretion by officials to attain the ends of the law, extensive
discretion can in reality, however, also be associated with legal forms which,
in fact, ostensibly purport to curtail rather severely the amount of discretion
which legal actors should exercise. For instance, the evidence in the United
States has been that more scope for bargaining as to plea in criminal cases
has been found where jurisdictions have adopted legislatively-fixed sentences
whose intention is to remove sentencing discretion from the judge. 40 And
where attempts are made to regulate discretion with detailed rules, the amount
of discretionary latitude is by no means reduced, as Long's study of federal
41
tax legislation discovered.
Doubtless, however, there are a number of constraints upon discretion
which (presumably) inhere in legal rules or judicial precedent. To a variable
extent such rules expressing the legal ideal are translated into the reality of
legal action in the web of decisions made by human beings. The degree to
which the two correspond almost certainly varies depending upon the branch
of law and the particular legal rule concerned. Besides, it is still empirically
rather unclear how legal rules or statements actually influence legal discretion,4 2 and it is difficult methodologically to throw light on the issue by
listening to decision-makers discuss their judgments in a formal fashion.
What decision-makers may later articulate as decision criteria or principles
may in fact be criteria or principles. But if they are not, they amount to
justifications for, rather than explanations of, a decision, and that is a rather
different matter. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the image of the
rational, calculating, introspective decision-maker can be over-extended, and
it is necessary to contemplate the possibility that many kinds of legal decisions
may be made without being logically thought through, because they are
made on impulse, or because they are made in conformity with "normal"if often intellectually unexplored-ways of deciding matters. 4 This may even
be true to some extent of those decision-makers who have the opportunity
for calm reflection and reasoning before announcing a decision. A small
study of sentencing recently carried out in England found, for instance, that
many judges "appeared not to have thought systematically about some of

39. N. WALKER, SENTENCING INTHEORY, LAW AND PRACTICE 105 (1985).
40. D.

NEWMAN,

CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION

OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

(1966); J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD
GUILTY (1977); K. Hawkins, "On Fixing Time: Reflections on Recent American Attempts to
Control Discretion in Sentencing and Parole," unpublished paper presented at the Howard
League Seminar Series, "The Future of Parole," London School of Economics, October, 1980.
TRIAL

41. S.Long, Social Control in the Civil Law. The Case of Income Tax Enforcement, in
LAW AND DEVIANCE 185 (L. Ross ed., 1985).
42. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
43. D. Sudnow, supra note 16.
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the [sentencing] issues ... raised with them." 44 The researchers also noted
"the clear indications that judges are relatively unaware of their own
sentencing pattern and relatively unaware of the extent to which it is their
own beliefs which constrain their sentencing decisions.' ' 41 The methodological
implication for any retrospective analysis of decision behavior using interview
or documentary analysis techniques is significant to the extent that it is
accepted that there may well be a disjunction between word and deed, and
possibly one also between thought and deed.
On Decision Outcome and Other Matters
I have already noted the fact that many key legal decisions have binary
outcomes. The formal legal system is ultimately founded upon the production
of a digital reality (in the language of communication theory), whereas the
problems law addresses are analogic in character. 46 Digital reality, expressed
in binary outcomes, is particularly observable in the ultimate formal decisions
in a court of law, in which it is decided that a person is guilty or not, liable
or not, or that an appeal should succeed or not. Yet the world is not a
simple place and the indeterminacy of the banal facts of everyday life
comprising the social problems prompting legal intervention is complicated
and intractable. This, after all, is why law is used. The law is a problemsolving mechanism, but in order to do its work it must compact reality into
manageable molds. Hence the law prefers to address the world with the
rigors of a system of binary logic. Thus one is in law married or not,
unemployed or not; 47 or one does, or does not, have a right or a duty. In
reality, of course, people would often find it difficult to describe their
position in such uncompromising categories. Binary logic is particularly
evident in the way in which the law provides answers to problems-that is,
in the way in which it produces decisions-but it also emerges in the reasoning
which allows those decisions to be produced. The complexities of any case
tend to be compressed by the method of formal law at key points-and not
simply in formal and public arenas-into opposing alternatives: liable/not
liable, guilty/not guilty.
In an adversarial trial, the partisan, normative character of fact finding
becomes clear.4 1 Indeed, the imperative to answer a question insists on binary
outcomes. In operating within an adversarial structure, law creates established
facts, practical certainties, rights and wrongs. A legal judgment does not in
effect concede probabilities; it does not recognise the uncertainties and

44. A.

ASHWORTH,

E.

GENDERS,

G. MANSFIELD,

J. PEAY, &

THE CROWN COURT: REPORT OF AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

E.

PLAYER,

SENTENCING IN

16 (1984).

45. Id. at 17.

46. K. Schuyt, "Law as Communication," unpublished paper presented to the annual
conference of the International Sociological Association Research Committee on the Sociology
of Law, St. Hugh's College, Oxford, 1981.
47. Id.
48. See V. Aubert, supra note 20, at 91.
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indeterminacy of life but makes a quite categorical statement. It is not given
to compromise, which is only possible in second-order decisions-for instance, as to settlement out of court, or the award of damages, or the
sentence in a criminal case, or the awards of costs in trial cases. It is the
first-order decisions in law which are usually binary in character. However,
the main point is that the reality of the formal legal process is adjudicating
49
a matter of guilt-or innocence, liability-or no liability.
The implication of binary decision outcomes which exist at salient points
in the sequence of legal decisions is that following adjudication law imposes
all upon, or gives all to, one party but not the other. It is never certain
which party will receive the whole benefit or the whole penalty, 0 which,
after all, is why courts are used to provide an authoritative answer to the
question in the first place. The people caught up in this process often have
a strong incentive, then, to avoid the all-or-nothing position and this gives
rise to a considerable willingness on their part to engage, for example, in
pre-trial negotiations about settling a tort claim5 or about pleading guilty in
a criminal case.5 2 Bargaining is employed by both parties to avoid the various
costs and uncertainties of adjudication.
But despite the law's appearing to prefer digital decision-making, the
great bulk of legal work is done by relying on decisions which are analogic
in character. Most legal problems are settled by bargaining. Furthermore,
many second-order decisions following a formal adjudication, though contingent on the earlier binary outcomes, yield graded outcomes. One of the
most important decisions in civil legal processes, for example, is concerned
with the amount of settlement that is appropriate in or out of court, once
the principle of liability has been decided or accepted: It may be the most
trivial sum, or an enormous one; it is, almost always, something in between.
Sentencing in criminal cases is a decision that also displays a wide array of
graded outcomes; 3 in English penal law nearly all cases may, in theory, be
disposed of, upon conviction, by means ranging from an absolute discharge,
or some sort of non-custodial penalty, to any period of imprisonment up to
the maximum specified by statute, with the possibility of consecutive sentences for multiple convictions. It would appear that decision-makers quite
often use such a wide range in possible outcome to mitigate the rigors of a
prior binary choice, as when, for example, derisory damages are awarded in

49. I recognize that in some jurisdictions there may be the possibility of a "not proven"
finding or the existence of doctrines of contributory negligence, but this does not affect the
basic point I wish to make.
50. V. Aubert, supra note 20.
51. L. Ross, supra note 8; J. Phillips & K. Hawkins, Some Economic Aspects of the
Settlement Process:A Study of PersonalInjury Claims, 39 MOD. L. REV. 497 (1976).
52. D. Newman, supra note 40; L. Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case
Disposition:Decision-Making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 187

(1974).
53. D. THOMAS,

PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING
AND PENAL POLICY (1983).

(2d ed. 1979); A.
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civil proceedings to a claimant, perceived in fact-if not law-to be undeserving, who has won on liability in a marginal case, or when a judge hands
down a seemingly lenient sentence to a person convicted of an ostensibly
serious offense (or vice versa).
Sometimes a bargained decision can take on the categorical character of
a binary outcome. For example, I shall show below how some American
parole boards may decide in principle to release-but delay the effect of
their decision for some months. This is a de facto conditional decision, a
tactic often used as a bargaining ploy in marginal cases which do not seem
to be obviously deserving of immediate release or immediate refusal. The
tactic is used where the board is under pressure to maintain a sufficient
turnover of the prison population but the possible candidates do not visibly
measure up to the standards of suitability which the board wishes to establish
and announce to the prison population as a whole. Is such a ploy to be
regarded in binary terms as a decision to release or deny? The commitment
to release (albeit reluctantly) which seems to be evident here may be less
certain when we take into account that many of these deferred releases are
in fact bargains struck with prisoners in the interests of institutional control,
and the decision to release may be revoked or further delayed if the prisoner
fails to live up to some requirement about his continued good conduct. In
other words, the apparently adjudicative nature of parole board decisionmaking may in certain cases more closely resemble decision-making by
negotiation.
Furthermore, it is possible to view many legal decisions as in a sense
containing overlapping or sequential digital and analogic elements. Police
officers may sometimes decide to arrest a suspect, or to do nothing. But
quite often they may decide not to arrest but to take other forms of action
54
with the suspect, such as temporary detention, a formal caution, and so on.
Indeed one can speculate that in rehearsing the various possible decisions
available in any case, decision-makers proceed by using both digital and
analogic procedures. For example, an ostensibly analogic decision may
actually be treated by the decision-maker as a binary choice, at least to begin
with. In the example of sentencing in criminal cases, it is possible that in a
number of cases of moderate seriousness (either in terms of gravity of the
offense, or the offender's persistence in crime)-or perhaps in all cases-a
judge actually begins the process of deciding a sentence by considering the
question of whether the offender deserves to be confined or not. The analogic
questions concerning degree of punishment are then contingent upon this
prior digital decision as to the fundamental kind of punishment. It is
conceivable, therefore, that a categorization of decision outcome as either
digital or analogic may overlay quite complex processes and suggest a
spurious simplicity.
What in the literature of decision-making is regarded as a decision
actually consists of two distinct components. We typically regard a legal

54. See, e.g., I. Piliavin & S. Briar, supra note 10.

1178

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1161

decision as one implying an action-arrest, sentence, or settlement. However,
much more subtle, complex, and necessarily prior matters are decisions which
select or define the "facts" or referents" deemed relevant to a decision.
These may encompass a range of potentially relevant facts from, say, how
the member of a parole board should regard the toy pistol which the convicted
armed robber is reported to have been brandishing in the supermarket, to
choices about which pieces of an assemblage of information presented as the
material out of which a decision is to be forged, need reading or treating
seriously.
Such matters are presumably the very stuff of policy decision-making,
but they are crucial also to the making of case decisions. For example, when
officials handle criminal cases and talk of such things as "offense," "record," and "personality," to what do these words refer, and what do they
mean? Is it the case that the "facts of the case" speak for themselves, and
can be taken for granted, or are the "facts" themselves matters of interpretation?
In the real world of legal action facts are rarely self-evident, especially
in a legal system organized around the principle of adversarial debate. In
effect, as Aubert has observed, law creates its own reality.5 6 Whether a tort
claim for damages for personal injury is being pursued, for example, or a
prosecution for an alleged criminal offense, adversarial confrontation which
seeks to make the better case (rather than expose "the truth"-though I
recognize that evidence lawyers will hold a different view) means that two
contrasting images of reality are created quite artfully by lawyers and
presented to those with responsibility for decisions about liability or guilt.
Note also the trial lawyer's concept of "the other side" and the extent to
which this suffuses decisions made in anticipation of "what the other side
will do." In the prototypical drug trafficking case, for example, the jury
may be asked by counsel for the defense to believe that the defendant was
totally ignorant of the contents of the packet he was bringing in his bags
through the green channel at Heathrow Airport. He was merely doing an
innocent favor for a friend (and should therefore be found not guilty). On
the other hand, the jury may be told by prosecuting counsel that the
individual was a courier, deeply in debt and in immediate need of a large
sum of money, who belonged to a highly-organized drug-trafficking operation, some of whose members had also made the Heathrow run a number
of times before. The implication here, of course, is that the individual should
be found guilty, and-perhaps-should be punished accordingly. The jury's
"decision" in this kind of case, whose contrasting imagery is familiar to all
who work in the criminal-justice process, rests upon the greater plausibility
of one image rather than the other. In this decision setting the lawyers in
preparing and presenting their cases are essentially creating a framework for

55. D. Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAW
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1972).
56. V. Aubert, supra note 20.

AND

1986]

1179

LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

the making of a decision by recreating a particular kind of reality.
Furthermore, these "facts" which comprise the two competing images
of reality are not only presented in every contested criminal trial, they are
also present in every sector of the criminal process where a suspect, an
accused, a defendant, or a convicted person encounters an individual acting
as an officer of the state. The "facts" are themselves products of human
choice and judgment, since they are comprised of mosaics of a multitude of
decisions made earlier in the creation and processing of the case. One of the
consequences of the handling of legal cases over time is a recreation and
transformation of the matter comprising the legal case. It is in the nature of
the legal process to pare down or remove the uncertainty characteristic of
the real world. "[L]egal thinking and a legal view of social reality," wrote
Cicourel in his outstanding study of the juvenile justice system, "remove the
contingent features of everyday life in the course of successive transforma'5 7
tions over time from the original event or-act to final adjudication.
However, even when one might feel confident that the facts of any case are
a reliable representation of some real event, or that some assessment of
character is an accurate reflection of a real person, one still must contend
with the meaning conferred upon the "facts" by the framework within which
the decision-maker views his or her world, a subject to which I shall return
in more detail shortly.
The distinction between decisions about fact defining (and fact finding)
and action decisions is also important when addressing the question of the
relationship between rules and discretion. To claim that one is dispassionately
following a rule is to take for granted the interpretative work surrounding
fact finding, and to assume that the facts assembled are relevant to the
application of that particular rule (rather than another one), quite apart
from the judgments made about the rule itself, its nature and relevance.
II.

FOREGROUND

On Rationalist Conceptions of Decision
Research which has displayed an interest in understanding the decision
behavior of legal officials has tended to be cast within two very different
intellectual traditions. In this paper I wish to argue for the value of naturalist
research conducted within a broadly interpretive or phenomenological framework in which emphasis is given to matters of process and meaning, content
and context. Accordingly, I shall criticize research within the other tradition,
which I shall refer to as rationalist.
I regard rationalist work as positivist and normative in character. Emphasis here is given to notions such as rationality, information, and decision
goals. Empirical research in this tradition usually focusses upon input to and
output from decision-makers, and the strength of any empirical association

57. A.
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27-28 (1968).
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that can be demonstrated between the two. The rationalist approach to
research design tends to take the official objectives imputed to a particular
segment of the criminal justice system 58 as a given (vague, inconsistent, or
assumed in character though they may be), and then to see how the existing
decision practices within that segment seem to measure up to those objectives.
The naturalist, on the other hand, is much less likely to be involved in a
research enterprise explicitly directed towards changing things, and is instead
concerned with understanding and explaining what legal decision practices
are, and what shapes them.
The essential criticism made in the following pages about work in the
rationalist tradition is not that the authors do not appreciate the richness
and variety of the many sorts of decision criteria which may be treated as
relevant, but that their lack of a naturalist understanding of how routine
legal decisions are actually made creates serious flaws in their accounts. The
rationalist literature of decision-making, for example, has a tendency to
focus on adjudicated decisions, a tendency reflected in its concern with
sentencing and parole studies in particular, despite the widespread practice
of decision-making by negotiation. Another problem of rationalist work, in
my view, is a utilitarian and normative character which also obscures or
distorts the nature of decisions in the real world. I shall discuss this point
more generally in what follows, but one example of the difficulty I have in
mind would be the unrealistically narrow and inaccurate conception of what
constitutes "information" for any decision. A central decision-making problem for the rationalist is uncertainty, a difficulty to be remedied by more
and better quality information and information handling capacities. 9 Such
a focus, however, tends to close off certain important characteristics. Thus
there seems to be little awareness that information may well not be neutral
or objective, but may instead be deliberately or unwittingly contrived by
suppliers or creators of information in artful ways to produce certain effects
upon the decision-makers' behavior.
This will be one theme in what follows. Subsequent discussion will then
be devoted to a second theme, which is a methodological critique, since the
frailties in rationalist work are, in my opinion, further exposed by the
particular sorts of research methods employed. The final theme will address
the question of meaning in decision behavior, since there seems to be little
or no sensitivity in rationalist work to the significance of what data mean to
a decision-maker, and how a piece of information may acquire a particular
meaning and relevance depending upon the way it is framed and made sense
of by a person making a decision. I think there is some recognition of some
of the problems in this aspect of rationalist decision-making work in the

58. I organize the discussion around the criminal justice system in particular here since it
has almost exclusively been the subject of research in the rationalist tradition.
59. See D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HomFt.N, GUIDELINES FOR SENTENCING AND
PAROLE

105 ff. (1978).
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following remarks of one of its most distinguished practitioners, Leslie
Wilkins: 60
Perhaps our main problem is that we have not been honest in our
language in discussing criminal justice procedures. We have tried to
believe that our actions were rational when they were mainly symbolic
and we have used the language of a medical analog and confused
many significant issues of equity in the process. If we were to
acknowledge the symbolic elements, we might begin to understand
their import and discover that they were of considerable value.
To give the critique of rationalist studies of decision-making some focus,
I shall organize my remarks around the contents of two books in particular:
Decision-making in the Criminal Justice System: Reviews and Essays, edited
by Don M. Gottfredson (1975), and Decisionmaking in Criminal Justice:
Toward the Rational Exercise of Discretion, by Don M. And Michael R.
Gottfredson (1980). At the outset, it is important to be clear that my
argument is not that measurement of natural phenomena is not a worthwhile
thing to do, or that we should not be concerned with policy questions about
how to make legal decisions somehow "better" or more "fair." These are
self-evidently important issues. What I do want to suggest, however, is that
the conceptual and methodological stances of rationalist work give rise to
difficulty, and that rationalist work sometimes displays the influence of
various assumptions and preconceptions about the behavior under study
which are empirically questionable. One of the implications of this is that to
the extent that the research seeks to portray actual decision behavior it is
seriously flawed, and it becomes correspondingly less valuable to policymakers, lawyers, and others who would wish to change things.
My first critical theme was of a simplistic or distorted appreciation of
the nature of real decisions. It is as if the rationalists seek to portray the
jungle of human decision-making by removing all the undergrowth, scrub,
and saplings, leaving a broad landscape over which are dotted a number of
large and important trees. Their landscape of legal decisions consists of some
significant and salient markers which change the status of the individual
caught up in the administration of the criminal law from suspect, to accused,
to defendant, to prisoner, to parolee, and so on. But how all this happens
is never clear. The rationalists ignore both the supporting work that makes
such transfers of status possible, and the context in which this all happens.
Their picture is serene and orderly, but it lacks both detail and background.
One of the ways in which violence is done to the natural world resides
in the assumptions which rationalists bring to their explorations. For instance,
there seems to be a supposition in the rationalist literature6' that legal
decision-making is essentially a utilitarian exercise aimed at attaining the

60. L. Wilkins, Perspectives on Court Decision-Making, in D. GOTTFREDSON (ed.), DE81 (1975).
61. E.g., D. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 60.
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officially-proclaimed objectives of whichever part of (say) the criminal justice
system that is being studied. When the proclaimed official goals of the
criminal justice system are taken as a description of what in practice the
goals of decision-makers are (as Gottfredson and Gottfredson 62 seem to do),
it is not surprising to find statements such as, "Utilitarian aims lie at the
heart of every decision we have discussed.' '63 Yet this bold assertion is hardly
supported by the authors' subsequent discussion in the same chapter, or the
many references which they make to such concepts as justice, equity, or
commensurability. This is a problem inherent in the rationalist approach
which takes official objectives as a given. Thus, for instance, it seems to be
taken for granted that parole boards work primarily in terms of predicting
who will be risky prisoners to release and adopting a practice accordingly of
releasing the less risky while holding the more risky (a view, incidentally, on
which much of the critical penological literature of the 1970s 64 was based).
It may well be that in certain circumstances this is what some members of
some parole boards do. But until thorough descriptive analyses of the actual
practices of parole board members are carried out, the assumption about the
importance of risk reinains an assumption. (It should be noted also that the
concept of "risk" is usually left imprecise, without any suggestion as to
whether it refers to likelihood of failure, gravity of failure, or a mix of the
two.) My own research into parole decision-making in various American
states65 suggests that far from "the ubiquitous centrality of prediction" (as
Gottfredson and Gottfredson put it)66 in criminal justice decision-making, a
substantial part of parole board discretion is reflective and backward-looking
in character, essentially concerned with punishing the wickedness of the
offense and giving the prisoner his just deserts, rather than predictive and
preoccupied with the prisoner's future risk. Indeed, to the extent that
decision-makers are motivated by moral, retributionist concerns, decisions
are reflective, not predictive, in character. In this connection it is worth
recalling the enormous amount of work carried out since the late 1920s on
the development of parole prediction tables, 67 which were originally designed
to assist board members in appreciating the riskiness of parole candidates.
The evidence is that these prediction devices were hardly ever, if ever,
employed as decision aids, 68 even though it is well-known that their accuracy

62. D. GOTTFREDSON & M. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 11.
63. Id. at 334.
64. E.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT

(1974); A. VON HIRSCH & K.

HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM, OR ABOLITION?

(1979).

65. K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
66. D. Gottfredson & M. Gottfredson, supra note 11, at 334.
67. E.g.,

K.

HAWKINS,

PAROLE: A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 1971).

68. K. Hawkins, "Parole Selection: The American Experience," Ph.D. dissertation,
Cambridge University, 1971; V. Evjen, Current Thinking on Parole Prediction Tables, 8 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 215 (1962).
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is generally superior to clinical decision-making practices.6 9 The failure to
use prediction tables may well be another piece of evidence to suggest that
decision-makers in the real world by no means operate with the same
objectives and procedures as those imputed to them by researchers.
This is not to argue that parole-board members and other kinds of legal
decision-makers do not make predictive decisions. Sometimes they do-and
in the sense intended by rationalist researchers. Very often, however, predictive judgments are made which are predictive in another sense. A good deal
of legal work consists of decisions made in anticipation of what others will
do-one of the skills of the practising lawyer after all is to be able to advise
a client in light of predictions about what the other side is likely to do.
Indeed, bargaining in legal contexts ("in the shadow of the law", in Mnookin's
memorable phrase)70 is made possible through the tacit predictions of the other
party's likely repertoire of moves in response to particular decisions which
might be made about courses of action or inaction.
It is possible that the degree to which a decision is predictive in character
(in the sense in which the rationalists mean it) varies according to its point
in the process and perhaps depending upon structural features of the system
in question. It is conceivable, for example, that decisions about whether to
bail or to detain before trial may indeed be concerned with the court's
prediction of whether the accused will present himself for trial. That is, in
law, what the bail decision is supposed to be about. Though even here there
is evidence that, in making the decision, courts are more concerned with the
reflective consideration of the gravity of the offense charged. Again, it is
necessary to study the naturally-occurring behavior unencumbered by any
particular expectations (derived from official statements of goal) about what
the research should show.
The concept of rationality itself poses problems when used to inform
research on legal decision-making. Leslie Wilkins defines as a rational
decision7 '
that decision among those possible for the decision-maker which, in
the light of the information available, maximizes the probability of
the achievement of the purpose of the decision-making in that specific
and particular case.
It might be observed in passing that the quantitative methods employed by
rationalist students of decision-making seem to be calculated precisely not to
understand what "the purpose of the decision-maker in that specific and
particular case" might be. But the concept of rationality raises serious

69. P. Meehl, et a., supra note 14; see also J. Carroll, R. Wiener, D. Coates, J. Galegher
& J. Alibrio, Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Prediction in ParoleDecision-Making, 17 LAW AND
Soc'y REV. 199 (1982); D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE
AND SENTENCING

70. R.

(1978).

MNOOKIN, BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW: THE CASE OF DIVORCE (1979).

71. Wilkins, supra note 60, at 70.
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questions when considered in conjunction with legal processes. What does a
rational decision look like when it is difficult to conceive of a legal decision
or a legal institution with a single purpose? What does a rational decision
look like when its purpose is confused, unknown, or not widely accepted as
legitimate? For example, what was generally accepted as the official goal of
the parole system used to run something like: "The rehabilitation of the
offender and the protection of the public," which presumably meant that in
practice the purpose to be achieved by parole board members was to release
reformed offenders without risk to the community (idealistic though that
may seem). But could legitimate purposes have also included making release
decisions in such a way as to introduce greater equity among disparate,
judicially-fixed prison sentences? Or not releasing badly-behaved prisoners?
Or underlining the deterrent function of a sentence, even though there may
have been no need for rehabilitation and no risk to the community? Or
maintaining a steady turnover of the prison population in the interests of
administrative efficiency and state economy? The rationalist writers seem to
construct a notion of rationality derived either from some conception of
what a decision is supposed officially to be about, or from claims by decisionmakers about what they are trying to do (what people say, of course, and
what they do are not necessarily the same). In short, to talk of rationality
in legal decision-making presumes some clear knowledge of the decisionmaker's goals. In empirical terms we do not know a great deal about actual
decision goals, and in policy terms it is often by no means clear what the
official goals of parts of the justice system are supposed to be. Those who
design the institutions of (say) criminal justice or social regulation presumably
do so in response to certain pressures and constraints and to attain certain
ends-not necessarily clear or specific ends. The institution is born and
sustained with appropriate rhetoric. Meanwhile those who have to make the
institution work will have their own objectives and be subject to their own
constraints and pressures, of which the institutional designers may have only
been dimly aware. They have to get their jobs done with limited resources,
ironing out possible inconsistencies and anomalies in the design of the
institution while at the same time maintaining an appropriate public face for
the institution and its position in the network of other institutions and
agencies comprising the larger system. In all of this it would not be prudent
to assume that any particular announced utilitarian aim survives its transformation and expression in the real world of actual practice with its purity
72
unsullied.
72. Thus discussing the history and evolution of parole in the United States, Gottfredson
and Gottfredson state: "the utilitarian goals of treatment and incapacitation both were clearly
involved at the outset; and so were the concepts of classification and prediction." D. GorrREDSON
& M. GOTITRaDSON, supra note 11, at 282. This confident assertion is unsupported by any reference.
It is by no means clear how, or to what extent, the goals to which the authors refer were "involved",
or how they might have been related to others. For an alternative historical view, see D. ROTHMAN,
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA

(1980); S. Messinger, J. Berecochea, D. Rauma, & R. Berk, The Foundations of Parole in
California, 19 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 69 (1985).
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Much of what I am criticizing in rationalist research on decision-making
derives from its normative character. A good deal of the penological writing,
for example, is explicitly correctionalist in tone. For instance, Don Gottfredson refers to the "kind and degree of treatment most appropriate .

.

. for

individuals," and argues that "to the extent that similar persons respond
differently to differential program placements, that experience could guide
future decisions and thus could improve the results of jail and probation
programs." ' "3 Indeed one of Gottfredson's chapters in Decision-making in
the Criminal Justice System is actually called "Correctional Decision-making," explicitly reflecting a presupposition about the goals of the process.
Not surprisingly, the remedies prescribed in the chapter are based upon this
assumption about the essentially corrective character of the penal system, in
the absence of any empirical analysis of its actual nature.
Leslie Wilkins shares Gottfredson's approach. Wilkins asks the question,
"How may a decision-maker seek to increase his confidence that a decision
he may make is correct?" 74 To pose the question in this way is to put the
issue in utilitarian terms. It may be the case that in many legal decisions the
decision frame (see below) employed is not utilitarian at all, but a moral
one. 5 And even if we accept that a decision may have been informed by
utilitarian concerns, it suggests that decisions are single-valued, when in fact
they may be a good deal more complex than that, with different interests to
be served in different contexts or at different times. Indeed, the emphasis
upon the utilitarian character of decision behavior in legal settings may be
overdone. For instance, the rationalist uses the language of "feedback"
because it is important that the rational decision-maker know the results of
his or her decision. But if the decision-maker is involved in a moral enterprise
in which a decision is intended to reflect upon a rulebreaker's moral deserts
and thereby to administer punishment for retributive purposes (like many
sentencing judges, say), the concept of feedback is not relevant. The retributive sentencing judge does not need feedback because his decision is
rational to the extent that it metes out due punishment in just proportion to
the wickedness and harmfulness of the crime. Similarly, in a decision context
of negotiation (rather than adjudication) a bargainer does not need feedback
either, because the rationality of the decision is determined by the acceptance
of the compromise negotiated.
My second critical theme spoke to the widespread adoption of quantitative research methods in an effort to describe and explain the behavior of
legal decision-makers. The work has been heavily influenced by statistical
decision theory and it focuses in particular upon information and outcome.
My argument here is that such an approach is not so much inappropriate as
premature.
73. D. Gottfredson, Correctional Decision-Making, in D. Gottfredson, supra note 60
(emphasis in original).
74. Wilkins, supra note 60, at 66.
75. E.g., R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT
(1969); K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
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While quantitative data may have a security about them, a feeling that
numbers are unproblematic and can be trusted, there is a difficulty for the
reader in such work that arises from its essentially atheoretical character.
What the work does in relating output to input is essentially to predict
decision outcomes rather than to explain decision-making processes. Without
some effort to theorize about the meaning of the statistical patterns revealed
we are left with a laundry list of "factors" or "criteria" that explain
variance, but without any suggestion as to how these matters are actually
connected with the outcome of decisions, or what determines the ascendancy
of one variable over another as the dominant influence upon the decision
made. The tone of hesitation, of speculation, when researchers come to try
is evident
to understand what their quantitatively-derived data might mean
76
Gottfredson:
and
Gottfredson
by
remarks
following
the
from
If the judge's assessment of risk (prognosis for recidivism) and
offense seriousness, together with the legal class, are interpreted to
be major determinants of the decision (which is plausible though not
proved by this analysis), it may be asked how this relates to the
sentencing purposes discussed above. The latter two items both may
be interpreted as indicants of seriousness-one reflecting the judges'
assessments, the other that of the legislature in establishing the legal
offense classes. Thus, the use of these factors may be regarded as
attuned to the desert aim. At the same time, however, they may
reflect concern for general deterrence or treatment, including special
deterrence. From this analysis it is not possible to tell. The situation
is similar when one considers the factor of recidivism probability.
At first glance, it may appear that this item is deemed relevant in
respect to incapacitative aims. It is possible, though, that this may
imply to the judge a greater need for treatment, in order to reduce
the perceived probability of repeated offending.
My point is not to complain about the caution that the authors rightly
display but rather to suggest the considerable amount of interpretative work
which the reader must engage in when struggling to make sense of hard
data. But at the same time, the authors' serpentine rehearsal of one possible
meaning then another in their efforts at balance and evenhandedness does
betray their lack of real contact with their data. I do not want to suggest
with these remarks, however, that the authors do not appreciate the significance of the meaning of things to those who make decisions. They do, as
the following questioning about the pervasive importance of an offender's
prior record in decision-making suggests:"

The persistence of this correlate of decision outcomes also raises
numerous critical issues. Does it signify, for example, simply another

76. D. GOrTFREDSON & M. GOTrFREDSON, supra note 11, at 187.
77. Id. at 331, footnote omitted.
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measure of "legal seriousness," whereby not the act but the person
is regarded as "more serious" and thus deserving of greater state
intervention? Or is the repeated use of this factor related primarily
to predictive aims of incapacitation and treatment? What are the
implications of fairness of compounding decision after decision on
the basis of the same data about previous conduct? We can only
raise these questions here, noting that they arise from the consistency
of the empirical findings reviewed in this book.
It is a nice question, in fact, whether the way in which a research
problem is conceptualized leads to the adoption of a particular kind of
research method, or whether the way in which a problem is conceived of
and defined is substantially a consequence of the research method employed.
In many of the quantitative analyses of sentencing or parole decision-making,
for example, a stimulus-response model of decision behavior is employed.
The "decision" is treated as a choice made by an individual or a panel of
decision-makers based upon unproblematic "factors" or "criteria." These
latter are deducible from an analysis of a putative relationship between
observed input to the decision-maker (in the form of information of various
kinds) to observed output (namely the particular choices made). The nature
of the link between the two-how input is transformed into output-is,
however, not explored. The rather narrow field of relevant data derived from
a positivistic model produces a mechanistic image of decision-making. There
is little conception of decision-making as process, a highly subtle, shifting,
dynamic matter. Nor is there an appreciation of the problematic nature of
the information which is the raw material for decision. Little attention is
given to the broader constraints upon decision-makers and the contexts in
which they must work: ideological, symbolic, socio-political, economic,
organizational, and interactional. Finally, there is little consideration of the
interpretative work in which decision-makers engage and the meaning of
matters defined as relevant.
The quantitative methodologies employed have, in conjunction with a
limited and artificial conception of human judgment, tended to do violence
to the inherent complexities involved in making decisions in legal settings.
The result is a tendency to see a decision at a particular point in the legal
process as a salient and isolated matter, as something logically separable
from what surrounds it, what precedes-and, indeed, what follows-it in
the processing of cases. On this view, decisions are simple, discrete and
unproblematic, and not relatively complex, subtle, and part of, or the
culmination of, a process, in which external constraints, such as organizational and occupational rules, norms, procedures, and resources also operate.
Indeed, decisions may well appear to be simple, discrete matters because the
structure of the legal process requires them to be presented, described, and
sent forward for consideration in that form. It may also be the case that
decision-makers sometimes have an interest in making them appear so.
Many of the early sociological studies of legal decision-making conducted
with quantitative techniques seemed implicitly to recognize that much was
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missing from their analysis. In some of the "explanations" of decision
behavior in the sentencing literature, for example, it is clear that the
researchers acknowledged their analyses only offered a partial account of
the phenomenon under study, the unexplained residue being variously referred to as "the individuality of the judge, ' 7 8 "the human equation," the
"personality of the judge,'" 79 or "the subjective, intuitive assessment of the
individual case." 80 Another writer concluded that, "The personal attitude of
the trial judge and his individual sentencing habits have in fact a marked
influence," a matter subsequently referred to as an "indefinable element."'"
It is interesting, writes Asquith 2 in this connection, that "many researchers
have in fact claimed disparity can only be explained by reference to the
human element though they had neither collected information on the interpretation of information by individual magistrates nor on the actual processes
of the court hearing and the communication involved." Some decisionmaking studies, however, have attempted to address ostensibly wider issues
and to reduce the "individual factor" by introducing variables into the
analysis such as background, social class, education, and so on. Yet the
nature of the link between such variables and decision behavior again remains
unexplored.
This approach to formally rational decision-making analysis, wedded
though it is to quantitative techniques, ironically tends to yield an image of
decision-making as the product, to a significant extent, of ultimately inexplicable and evanescent human factors. Rather than suggest where regularities
in decision behavior might be found, it emphasizes human differences, since
it tends to produce evidence, for example, of apparent disparities in sentencing decisions made about apparently similar cases. In terms of relevance to
public policy, the attention drawn to discrepancy presents it as a pejorative
matter, rather than as an intrinsically interesting feature of human behavior
to be explored and explained. Furthermore, the focus on discrepancy lends
empirical credence to the currently influential view in administrative law that
much discretionary behavior is "arbitrary" or "capricious. "' 83' This is not to
doubt the possibility of disparate decisions. Indeed, it is well known that in
an experimental setting decision-makers will produce different decisions when
asked to judge the same hypothetical case 4-though such studies are typically

78. E. Green, quoted in R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY

ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY

152 (1970).

79. F. Gaudet, quoted id. at 152.
80. H. Mannheim, J. Spencer, & G. Lynch, quoted id. at 152.
81. S.Shoham, quoted id. at 152.
82. S. ASQUITH,
JUVENILE COURTS

CHILDREN AND JUSTICE: DECISION-MAKING IN CHILDREN'S HEARINGS AND

110 (1983).

83. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
84. P. Takagi, "Evaluation Systems and Adaptations in a Formal Organization: A Case
Study of a Parole Agency," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1967. See also J.Peay,
Mental HealthReview Tribunals: Just or Efficacious Safeguards?, 5 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 161

(1981).
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high on internal validity, but low on external validity.85 Yet we have perhaps
been too hasty in our judgments about "disparity" and "arbitrariness" or
"capriciousness," for a sensitive understanding of natural decision behavior
from the decision-maker's point of view will reveal in general a patterned,
situatedly rational process at work, even in those kinds of decisions extravagantly characterized by lawyers as examples of the operation of "unfet86
tered" discretion.
There are two other serious, inter-related, methodological problems in
this connection which should be aired briefly. One is the assumption in many
quantitative studies of decision-making that the only data relevant to a
decision are those concrete and documentary data which are retrievable
from case files (if these are the materials for decision)-as if sentencing
judges, for instance, operated in a vacuum, responding only to the evidence
adduced at trial perhaps in conjunction with the remarks of a probation
officer in a presentence social enquiry report. Judges live and work in the
community like the rest of us. They are conscious of prevailing climates of
opinion about how certain offenders should be punished. They are exposed
to the media and their concerns, like the rest of us. They work with colleagues
with whom they wish to maintain continuing relationships, colleagues who
may well have an interest in what decisions they make. They are also aware
of resource constraints, problems of institutional overcrowding, and so on.
Do these matters count for nothing in their day-to-day decisions?
The second problem is the prevailing image in much work in the
rationalist tradition that legal decisions are made by autonomous individuals
exercising a discretion essentially unencumbered by the preferences of their
colleagues, those who supply them with information, and those who will
have to handle the implications of their decisions. Criminal justice decisionmakers often "make" a decision only in the sense that theirs is the final
word on the matter, and they are accountable for it. But often their room
for decisional maneuver has essentially been foreclosed by decisions made
earlier in the process, or by the way information, assessments, or recommendations have been framed by others. In other kinds of decision setting the
autonomy of individuals may be substantially circumscribed by the presence
of colleagues with different views as to the proper decision in any case.
Before leaving the discussion of methodology and exploring the third
critical theme, of the significance in the real world of meaning and frame,
it is important to acknowledge that a considerable contribution to understanding natural decision behavior in legal settings has already been made in
a number of outstanding studies of various aspects of the legal process.
These authors,' working within broadly symbolic interactionist or ethno-

85. D.

FARRINGTON,

K.

HAWKINS & S.

LLOYD-BOSTOCK,

(eds.),

PSYCHOLOGY,

LAW AND

(1979).
86. See 0. Baldwin & K. Hawkins, DiscretionaryJustice: Davis Reconsidered, PuB. L.,
Winter, 1984, at 570.
87. See, e.g., D. Sudnow, supra note 16; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
LEGAL PROCESSES
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methodological perspectives, have illuminated many of the complexities of
decision-making. It is important to note, however, that for some of these
authors, at least, studying decision behavior as such may not have been the
central intention of their inquiries. Of the monographs which do explicitly
focus on the discretionary behavior of legal actors, however, two are
outstanding studies which both deal with the processing of juvenile delinquents: Aaron Cicourel's The Social Organizationof Juvenile Justice (1968)
and Judging Delinquents (1969), by Robert Emerson.
Cicourel's analysis illustrates an approach to legal decision-making as a
species of natural or practical decision-making which is very valuable.
Cicourel studied the routine decision processes surrounding juveniles who
encountered police, court officers, and teachers in their official capacities in
two cities in California, to see how they perceived and explained what was
done. He also gathered documents which were seen as summaries of very
complex events, observations, and interviews to explore the "unexamined
ways we idealize experience" and see how norms, values, rules, and assumptions get packed into selectively organized and remembered discourse and
textual representation. " 88 Once very diverse situations were typified (a "bad
attitude" on the part of a child, or a "broken home") and recorded, Cicourel
sought to see how court, police, and social workers' records became the
bases for reconstructions of people's lives and "careers."
The decision and decision-maker may be rational according to the
viewpoint of the actor, but rules used, information guiding decisions, the
processing and definition of such facts, the relevance of imputed conditions,
organizational position and goals are rarely gathered, according to Cicourel,8 9
and basic notions such as choice and decision on the part of actor are not
explicated. Actors' conceptions of the necessary articulation of formal,
abstract, statutes, customs, and precedents and the concrete situations that
reflect particular cases and events that arise are, he argues, particularly
critical in a legal analysis of decisions. An actor's conception of what is
"rational," "logical," "reasonable," and so forth, during the course of
action is Cicourel's basis for natural rationality. Cicourel's research suggests
many of the complexities inherent in the study of natural decision-making.
I have already asserted that a notion of decision frame is an important
concept in understanding how and why decisions are actually made. One of
the limitations of much existing work on legal decision-making, inherent in
its formal analysis of the process, is that it leads to the character and context

ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); E. Bittner, Police Discretion in Emergency
Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons, 14 SOCIAL PROBS. 278 (1967); A. BLUMBERO, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1967); L. Ross, supra note 8; J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); M. ATKINSON,
DISCOVERING SUICIDE: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SUDDEN
HEUMANN,

DEATH

(1978); M.

PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIEICES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTOR-

(1978); R. MCCLEARY, DANGEROUS MEN: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PAROLE (1978); M. FEELEY,
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
NEYS

88. A. CICOUREL, supra note 57, at xi (1968).

89. Id. at 46.

1986]

1191

LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

of decisions being ignored. Put another way, the focus on particular features
("factors" or "criteria") so dominates the analysis that the environment of
decision and its broader shaping forces are overlooked. Those who employ
the metaphor of the rational decision concentrate on matters variously
described as "factors" or "criteria" at the expense of a notion of decision
frame.
By "decision frame" I mean the structure of knowledge, experience,
values, and meanings that the decision-maker shares with others and brings
to a choice. In other words, a decision frame may be regarded as a master
code which shapes, typifies, informs, and even confirms the character of
choices. It determines, for instance, what information is to be sought, what
is to be used, and what meaning such information conveys, for notions of
relevance and significance are incorporated in the concept. In rationalist
research on decision behavior, "factors" or "criteria" are ostensibly those
things that are taken into account in reaching a decision and are treated,
therefore, as linked (in some unexplained way) with stipulated outcome. In
the absence of close study of natural decision-making, however, any link
made by the researcher between criterion and outcome has to be informed
with attributed meaning derived from theoretical presupposition or assumptions drawn from policy notions which claim to inform the exercise of
discretion. To be sensitive to the notion of decision frame, however, is to
allow a tie to be made between criterion and outcome, or to create a means
for interpreting the connections. The frame provides a set of background
expectancies or meaning for that criterion.9
A decision frame is not, however, rigidly applied. The frame may change
because the priorities accorded the values brought to any decision task
change. Decision-makers do not appear to be irrevocably wedded to a
particular frame through which they view the world. For example, when
resource availabilities change, decision priorities change. A recent paper by
Robert Emerson suggests how the problem of allocating resources differentially among a group of competing cases prompts what he calls "partial
caseload effects." One such effect is to lead to a subtle shift in the decision
frame adopted: 9'
One characteristic situation approximates the economic model of
marginal decision-making in which problems of allocation become
acute only after the point at which resources become scarce and
competitive. Thus, cases arising early in a case stream may be given
or denied resources solely on the basis of assessed 'need.' But as the
resource is used up, each next (marginal) decision becomes increasingly competitive with other actual or anticipated cases ....
A parole
agent may seek revocation rather freely, that is, without explicit

90. See id.; H.
REV.

GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

(1967).

91. R. Emerson, Holistic Effects in Social Control Decision-Making, 17
425, 445-446 (1983) (emphasis in orginal).
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reference to other cases or total caseload, until the 10 percent quota
is approached. At that point, each next possible revocation must
compete with other possible or anticipated revocations.
These remarks nicely illustrate the relativity of human judgment.
Furthermore, different decision frames can produce different outcomes.
Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 92 for example, have noted that people reach
different decisions on the same information. Doubtless one source of the
"disparity" which exercises critics of discretionary justice is different framing
of the same information by different decision-makers, while another is to be
found in the clash of an observer's (researcher's) decision frame with those
frames informing the judgments reached by decision-makers. Thus, when
writers refer to such abstruse ideas as typifications, 9 categorizations, or
shared perspectives, they are urging the reader to recognize that "facts,"
"cases," and even decisions themselves are both defined by a given frame
and granted meaning within that frame. Thus, a case does not exist as a
concrete entity, but is given meaning by the definitions brought to it by
people. Much research frequently reifies a case and a person, or a legal case
with an organizational label, when each of these definitions is a function of
an analytic perspective on the facts, not a set of predefined, independently
existing facts contained somewhere in a folder. In some cases the identity of
individuals, as holders of perspectives or group values, may be irrelevant to
explaining outcomes insofar as variance in case decisions may be better
explained by features inherent in the setting or context of the decision, such
as workloads, resource base, immediate socio-political environment, and so
94
on.
To illustrate some of these points, consider one of the most common
findings in the sentencing and parole studies. Something usually described
as "gravity of crime" is normally found to be the most important "factor"
in these decisions.95 What does this finding actually reveal? Unless the reader
speculates as to its meaning (which most readers probably do and need to
do) the finding yields little insight. If we consider two alternative decision
frames, however, "gravity of crime" can acquire two very different meanings. .Let us imagine a judge who actually believes in and puts into practice
in his or her sentencing the now unfashionable ideology of rehabilitation.
The seriousness of the offender's crime will be taken as crucial evidence of
some sort of underlying pathology, condition, or problem which requires
remedy in the form of a designated sentence with a particular form of
disposal and treatment currently deemed appropriate for rehabilitative purposes. Let us now assume the same crime is considered by a second sentencing
judge who moves in a moral world where rule-breaking should be visited

92. D. GOTTFREDSON & M. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 11.
93. D. Sudnow, supra note 13; P. ROCK, MAKING PEOPLE PAY (1973); W. Waegel, Case
Routinization in Investigative Police Work, 28 Soc. PROBS. 263 (1981).
94. I am grateful to Peter Manning for many of the points in this paragraph.
95. See, e.g., D. Gottfredson & M. Gottfredson, supra note 11.
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with punishment in due proportion to its wickedness and the harm done.
The seriousness of the offender's crime will again be employed as a "factor,"
but in this instance as telling evidence of evil which deserves punishment in
the form of a particular sentence of a particular weight. The two contrasting
decision frames may well produce very different outcomes (or indeed the
same outcome). In each case, however, it should be noted that the identified
primary factor or criterion is the same, and will appear to be the same in
research which ignores what criteria mean.
There are probably a number of master frames informing decision
behavior in legal settings, perhaps interacting with different emphases in
various segments of the criminal and civil systems. Some research has drawn
attention to the moral world in which legal decision-makers work. It does
seem that behavior which is guided by no sanction other than the individual's
sense of right or wrong 96 is a pervasive feature in human judgment in legal
settings. The strength of such individual values is suggested by a number of
studies of such diverse legal actors as juvenile justice officials, 97 pollutioncontrol officers, 9 child protection workers, 99 and parole-board members.' °°
The dominance of "tariff" sentencing which Thomas' 0' has discerned in the
formal judgments of the Criminal Division of the English Court of Appeal
is also surely explicable in moral terms. Moral fault, furthermore, is the
central notion in the conception and operation of the tort system. 0 2 Perhaps
none of this is surprising since so much of the substance of legal rules speak
to issues of right and wrong. The moral may be the dominant frame in
translating legal rules into legal action upon which other matters may be
contingent.
If the moral frame is regarded as a matter of personal values or ideology,
then another frame which may be relevant may be treated as a kind of
institutional ideology, one derived from conceptions of legal or organizational
mandate or the organizational interest. Presumably, legal actors behave to
some extent in accordance with or in response to their conception of what
their jobs entail. Legal mandates are often terse, patchy, or contradictory,
and are elaborated upon by the organization or professional association to
which the actor belongs. For example, it seems to be a characteristic of
regulatory systems of control that they emerge when the legislature defines
the existence of an undesirable social or economic problem in broad terms
(polluted water, dangerous workplaces, or impure food, for example) and
responds by creating an enforcement bureaucracy to do something about the

96. T.

SHIBUTANI,

SOCIETY AND PERSONALITY: AN INTERACTIONIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY (1961).

97. R. Emerson, supra note 75.
98. K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
99. R. DINOWALL, J. EEKELAAR, & T.

MURRAY,

THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (1983).

100. K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
101. D. Thomas, supra note 53.
102. D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD & Y.
BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984).
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problem. Precisely how the problem is to be remedied-what constitutes
"dirty water" (for example) in kind and degree, and how the organizational
conception of dirty water is to be implemented in practical terms-is,
however, left to the discretion of administrative officials in recognition of
the presumed impossibility of formulating rules which speak to any set of
possibly relevant circumstances that may be contemplated or encountered.
The legal mandate, such as it is, is translated and crystallized into a series
of agency objectives and practices that comprise the policy which ostensibly
informs the exercise of discretion in some (as yet imperfectly understood)
way. 103
A related set of organizational values are also known to influence
discretionary behavior. The constraints that inhere in organizational relationships introduce values which are concerned with doing legal jobs efficiently,
that is to say, displaying organizationally appropriate activity at a minimum
of personal time and trouble.' 4 Thus "covering oneself" from criticism from
organizational superiors seems to be a pervasive value in the exercise of
discretion by enforcement agents at street level,' 5 a strategy in American
policing (and, doubtless, other occupations) known as "CYA" (cover your
ass).'0 6 This reflection of an ultimate concern for self-preservation may
interact with the system of organizational control to impinge upon individual
discretion, resulting in decision behavior which resists the risky, the unorthodox, or the innovative.
To be concerned with matters of organizational control is essentially to
be concerned with the implications of various forms of decision outcomes
or causes of action. Decision behavior here is essentially prospective. Legal
decision-makers are often concerned with anticipating the consequences of
certain decisions which might rebound on the individual's future relationships
with colleagues or organizational superiors. We know something, for example, about the ways in which police discretion is affected by indicators of
organizational output such as arrest quotas,'0 7 or the clearance rate,' 0o or the
way in which a rule of, "Don't disagree with me and I won't disagree with
you," is often to be observed operating in parole panel decision-making.' °9
Often the supervening organizational relationships are a particularly dominating force, producing various notions of "tradition," "culture," or "normal policy" which shape an operational philosophy patterning routine
decisions. 110

103. See K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
104. A. Blumberg, supra note 87.
105. K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
106. P.

MANNING,

POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING 178 (1977).

107. D. Petersen, Informal Norms and Police Practice: The Traffic Ticket Quota System,
55 Soc. AND Soc. RESEARCH 354 (1971).
108. J. Skolnick, supra note 87.
109. K. Hawkins, supra note 68.
110. D. Sudnow, supra note 16; W. Waegel, supra note 93.
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The need of the individual as organizational actor to manufacture various
organizationally appropriate signs of suitable activity is also mirrored in a
broader sense at agency level. The shared concerns of officials comprising
the organization to dramatize impact or effectiveness in the police,", for
example, or a regulatory agency," 2 require attention in the field for the
implications for the organization of a particular course of action (or inaction)
which an individual official may choose to take. A form of covering
technique which operates at the institutional level is akin to the "covering"
behavior of individual officials. This is the minimax strategy which informs
decision-makers that cases should be handled so as to minimize the maximum
harm to the organization or institution-cases such as those possessing
properties which are likely to attract a great deal of public attention and
criticism if certain kinds of decision are made, or if adverse outcomes follow
the decisions.
Frame, then, is a feature of overriding importance in understanding
decision behavior. It is the means by which meaning and relevance are given
to information, for information as such does not automatically prompt a
particular decision, and it involves organizing, selecting, and omitting
"facts"-as well, of course, as interpreting them.
In the last part of this paper I shall present part of an analysis of the
exercise of discretion by parole board members in a number of American
states. In terms of some of the structural characteristics of decision-making
discussed earlier, the parole selection decision is formally an adjudicated
decision, though it will become clear from the data that a good deal of
bargaining between decision-maker and decision subject goes on in practice.
The decision is a case (rather than a policy) decision, made following personal
interview and study of written records and assessments, and to a greater or
lesser extent it is the product also of interaction between decision-makers. It
thus possesses elements of decisions made both in series and in parallel. The
purpose of this analysis of one of the least visible areas in the administration
of justice"3 is to suggest how concerns with such organizational preoccupations as the smooth administration of penal institutions, assistance in the
management of the prison system, and relationships with colleagues in the
institutions may come to dominate the exercise of discretion by a board
when confronted by certain kinds of cases. It is important to emphasize that
what follows is only a partial analysis, since it focusses upon the organizational aspects of parole-board work. In no sense is it intended to serve as a
descriptive analysis of parole-board behavior in general. Note, finally, that
the official, stated objectives of a parole board are supposed to be the
selective identification and release of presumably "rehabilitated" prisoners.

I !1. P. Manning, supra note 106.
112. K. Hawkins, supra note 4.
113. E. Poole & R. Regoli, supra note 34, at 392.
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III.

A PIECE OF DETAIL-AND BACKGROUND'

4

Tickets, Getting Out, and Running the Joint
Lewis Bolden [pseudonyms are used throughout] has been rescheduled to see the parole panel two weeks late because he was in
punitive segregation when he was originally due to appear before
the board. Before he comes in the panel discusses his institutional
misconducts and the sanctions they have invited. His sentence is a
five-year maximum for third-degree burglary.
"You've had some misconducts, Lewis ... in here," says Jerry
Gordon, the acting chairman. "Several ... indicative of short
temper or bad judgment or both, and some of them quite serious.
In fact you just picked one up, so I think the panel would like to
hear some explanation."
"Some of 'em were true, like. I got kinda excited."

114. The bulk of the data on which this part of the paper is based was collected in the
course of a study of decision-making practices in a number of American parole boards. Three
state boards are primarily represented; to preserve undertakings of confidentiality I have named
the states Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson (for the same reason I conceal the real names of
board members and prisoners). These jurisdictions were selected for study because they conferred
different degrees of administrative discretion upon their parole boards, as a consequence of
variations in their sentencing structures.
In Hamilton, the parole board operates in the leeway allowed between the minimum and
maximum terms (both of which are imposed by the judiciary). I regard this as an example of a
board working with middle-range discretion. Madison, on the other hand, has a parole board
which enjoys high discretion. In this state the maximum term is fixed by law (with typically
generous amounts of imprisonment possible), and the minimum term is fixed by the sentencing
judge. Jefferson was selected for study because it had recently introduced a system of parole
guidelines ostensibly to control the exercise of discretion by its parole board, and therefore
appeared to be a state in which the board had limited discretion. In this state the board operates
within very high maximum terms set down by statute. It fixes a term of imprisonment to be
served by each individual prisoner according to a complicated formula (speaking chiefly to the
gravity of the prisoner's crime) established by its parole guidelines.
The research methods employed were ethnographic and involved my attending during the
summer and fall of 1979 a series of parole board hearings in each state at a wide variety of the
prisons holding eligible inmates. In addition, I spoke at length with board members (tape
recording the discussions), and with prison and parole administrative staff. Some of the data
presented are drawn from research conducted with board members in 1967-68 and 1975.
Hamilton and Jefferson were two of the states researched in 1967-78 (reported in K. Hawkins,
supra note 67), together with two others (which I have referred to as Eastern state and Western state).
Though some of the data are quite old, this does not detract from the thrust of the analysis.
Indeed, for convenience, I use the "ethnographic present" in describing and discussing the
findings. Similarly, there have been changes in law and procedure in some of the states
researched more recently, affecting sentencing structure and parole-board practice, but again
this does not affect the point of the analysis. Indeed the decision behavior with which I am
concerned here was observable over time and across states which differed greatly in their
sentencing structures, policies and procedures. Differences observed were of degree, not kind.

19861

LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

1197

It emerges that the most recent infraction had occurred a week
before Bolden's parole hearing. He had a charge of possession of
dangerous contraband: a razor blade had been found in his cell.
Bolden says he used the blade to cut pictures out of magazines. He
was then put into administrative segregation, where he had problems
with a guard.
"Did you say you didn't hide the razor blade?" Gordon asks.
"Did you assume that other people knew you had it?" It then
emerges that the blade was set in a piece of wood. Bolden claims
that he did this to protect his fingers. "I'm asking," Gordon
explains, "to help know whether you realize how serious the infraction was and whether you did it deliberately to break the rule."
"Well. Oh, boy. He really raised hell here," Gordon says to his
colleagues after Bolden's fifteen-minute interview was over. "Now,
if we were all institution people [a comment directed to me, referring
to a lunchtime conversation we had had about the relevance of board
members' previous experience to their decision-making] he'd be
denied forthwith. I don't believe we have a hardened criminal here,
anything like that. But I do think we do have someone who doesn't
realize it but does need some kind of counseling. Do you want him
to get it here or outside? (Pauses-silence from colleagues.) Mental
health or something? (Pauses-more silence.) Let's give him a date
which shows him he's got to respect the rules of the institution."
The board fixes a parole date four months later, with a requirement for mental-health treatment on release. Bolden returns to the
hearing room and is told of the parole. "However," Gordon continues, "we found it necessary to let you know that you've got to
realize that you have to respect the rules of the institution, which
are [for] the protection of guards and inmates, and if there's any
serious infraction between now and then we might bring you back
...
to see you again." [A Hamilton case.]
The traditional positivist view of parole (one shared by rationalist writers)
calls for administrative discretion to be exercised in timing the release of
prisoners, in which the central issue is one of defining "suitability" for
release on parole. In a positivist decision frame, the suitable prisoner is one
who has made efforts at self-improvement, who has developed "insight" or
"maturity," who has acquired skills, or some other personal attributes,
which suggest a diminished propensity for further law-breaking. Parole
decisions are supposed to reflect these concerns, being at once diagnostic
and predictive. This utilitarian view of the parole system is accompanied by
a concern for how prisoners are to live under supervision in the community,
thus presumably assisting the constraints against further law-breaking. The
"success" of a parole system is contingent upon this, since it typically
displays its effectiveness by reference to parole-revocation rates. Parole
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supervision thus occupies a central place in the positivist's scheme as a system
of control over social deviants external to the prison.
In this discussion, however, I shall be concerned with
the part parole
plays as a means of control internalto the prison. The central theme is how
parole discretion may be framed by organizational, rather than positivist
considerations, or sometimes even considerations of a moral character (connected with punishing law-breakers with their just deserts), which arguably
is the dominant feature in parole decision-making." 5 Here I want to suggest
some of the implications for parole decision-making of a system of discretion
in which benefits are selectively conferred upon, or withdrawn from, a
captive population. My argument is that parole discretion may often be
directed not so much forward in time and outwards to the community, but
backwards to prison conduct and inwards to the institution, in response to
the decision-maker's conception of the organizational interests of penal
institutions. Ironically, however, it is by the standards of a prisoner's
subsequent behavior in the community that parole is normally evaluated.
The argument, then, is that whatever else they may try to do with their
decisions, members of parole boards seek to protect administrative values of
smooth, quiet and efficient management. This is revealed in a particularistic
concern for the condemning of certain kinds of conduct by individual
inmates, and a broader preoccupation for the control of inmate conduct in
an institution in general. Furthermore, however, the selective use of the
power to release early (and, to a lesser extent, the selective use of the power
to revoke parole and recall the individual to prison to continue his sentence),
is employed in a broader context to assist in the management of population
levels (and implicitly, costs) in the penal system. Towards the end of the
discussion, therefore, I shall address some of the ways in which parole
discretion may be employed as an administrative decision in which the
primary concern is with the maintenance of relationships with other segments
of the criminal justice system.
The focus of the discussion, however, is the proposition that parole may
be employed as a subtle control system directed to the management of inmate
behavior. 1 6 The parole board is not simply concerned with the extent to

115. K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
116. Note that quantitative analyses of parole decision-making also suggest the importance
of institutional conduct and its relationship with decision outcome. In Pennsylvania, for example,
it appeared to be "the single strongest factor associated with the parole decision": J. Carroll
et al., supra note 14, at 212. In Oklahoma it was "the most striking feature of the parole
hearings" of a board which operates part-time: J. Conley & S. Zimmerman, Decision Making
by a Part-TimeParoleBoard: An Observationaland EmpiricalStudy, 9 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
BEHAVIOR 396 (1982). "Those inmates receiving the most disciplinary reports were incarcerated
the longest", writes Scott, "even when the legal seriousness of the crime and all other
independent variables were controlled." J. Scott, The Use of Discretion in Determining the
Severity of Punishment for Incarcerated Offenders, 65 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 214, 219 (1974). The key question, however, to repeat the argument again, is why this
should be so: are badly-behaved prisoners predicted to be badly-behaved citizens, or are they
being punished for their misconduct for institutional control or other purposes?
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which prisoners observe the rules of the institution, but also the degree to
which they participate in prison programs, make efforts at self-improvement,
and in general act in ways of which the parole board and institutional
administrators approve. This system of control operates in a very simple
way, on the "carrot and stick" principle, by rewarding the compliant and
sanctioning the badly-behaved by grant or denial of parole, in much the
same way that prison guards reward and sanction inmates by their selective
enforcement of prison disciplinary rules."17 In fact parole boards are concerned with the implications of their words and actions for the prison
community as a whole-staff as well as inmates. For this reason the deterrent
rationale of sanctioning misconduct by denial has wide appeal. In using their
discretion to serve the ends of institutional control, parole-board members
exercise a real administrativeauthority. To understand the nature of decisions
about "justice," or, indeed, other kinds of legal decisions, an essential
dimension always to be addressed is the implication of dispensing justice by
organizational means. Legal punishments, indeed the implementation of legal
rules in general, are constrained by organizational considerations, and this
analysis is intended to suggest some of the ways in which this happens, using
the example of parole as an administrative device.
The scope of the parole decision as a means of managing institutional
conduct has long been formally recognized in the widely-observed requirement that parole boards be comprised of members ostensibly independent of
the prison ("ostensibly" because prison staff make a major contribution to
parole decisions in the information and evaluations on prisoners they compile
and present to the board in case files). The extent to which the use of parole
denial to sanction misconduct is employed seems to vary among members of
the same board, and probably varies substantially among states. In Jefferson,
for instance, the board's general approach is to leave specific questions of
control to the institutional authorities unless the misconduct is particularly
conspicuous. In Madison, on the other hand, the board is extremely sensitive
to any issues surrounding institutional control: "We probably are very ticket
[misconduct] conscious," said a member of the board, "and I think it's
from an institutional management point of view. . .

."

There are three

reasons in particular why this should be so. First, the Madison board operates
in a sentencing structure that grants it substantial discretionary latitude.
Administrative control will be a particularly sensitive issue in those jurisdictions in which the sentencing structure is such as to employ high maximum
terms and to confer wide discretion on the paroling authority, so that those
prisoners who are released at all tend to be released by parole." 8 Secondly,

117. R. CLOWARD, D. CRESSEY, G. GROSSER, R. MCCLEERY, L. OHLIN, G. SYKES & S.
MESSINGER, THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON (1960); G. SYKES,
THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958).
118. This issue, of course, is one of the mainsprings of the criticisms about the "unfettered"
discretion of parole boards. There remain, however, a number of jurisdictions in which the
board retains high discretion; at the time of fieldwork Madison and Jefferson (in effect, if not

in appearance) were two examples.
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most members of the Madison board have worked their way through the
state's penal system in their professional careers and are particularly alert to
questions about controlling prisoners; as one of them pointed out, "...
three or four of us come from the institution and, sure, we're going to be
very supportive of fit]." Two members, in fact, have worked all their careers
in the adult prisons and have personal experience of a major prison riot.
Thirdly, many Madison inmates are housed in one very large, maximum
security institution which by its very size proves to be extremely difficult to
manage, and many originate from a declining city well-known for its crime
problems. The result of all of this is that the Madison board is particularly
concerned with reports of institutional misconduct-"tickets" in paroleboard argot-and the inmate who does not have a ticket is a rarity in many
of the institutions.
Prison is a particular form of social organization, a species of "total
institution."" 9 Though the ideology of rehabilitation regards prison benevolently as a place of treatment and reform, the pre-eminent concern of any
prison official, and perhaps the defining characteristic of imprisonment, is
control of a potentially unruly clientele. Only when the demands of institutional control are satisfied can any other penal objectives of reform, deterrence, or incapacitation be attempted. Indeed, far from regarding control as
facilitating the aims of rehabilitation, staff may see the interests
of control
20
as readily served by institutional programs and privileges.'
The entire workability of the concept of rehabilitation is implicitly
founded on a recognition of the principles of reward and punishment. While
correctional theorists have argued that participation in prison programs must
be voluntary to be effective, it is widely accepted that inmates participate
"voluntarily" only as a means of achieving release as early as possible.
Offenders co-operate with correctional workers, Cressey has suggested,' 21
not in order to facilitate their own reformation but in order to secure
release from surveillance as quickly as possible and as unscathed as
possible. Prisoners, for example, participate in group therapy, group
counseling, and individual "intensive treatment" programs as much
from a belief that doing so will impress the parole board as from a
conviction that they, as individuals, need to change.
Thus, as board members are well aware, prisoners at their hearings will say
22
whatever they think will improve their chances:

119. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND
OTHER INMATES (1961).

120. The warden of an overcrowded institution in Jefferson, for example, was convinced
that the single most important influence underpinning his staff's control of inmates was the
provision of cable television in the cell blocks.

121. D. Cressey, Sources of Resistance to the Use of Offenders and Ex-Offenders in the
Correctional Process, in JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING,
OFFENDERS AS A CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER RESOURCE 45 (1968).
122. D. Jackson, Parole Board, Life, vol. 69, no. 2, p. 60 (1970).
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Johnson was nervous before the hearing. "I'm wondering whether
I'll say too much or not enough," he had said, "whether I'll put
my foot in my mouth. If they ask me 'Is this yellow wall blue?' I'll
say 'Of course it's blue'. I'll say anything I think they want me to
say, if they're getting ready to let me go."
Parole possesses, therefore, a subtly coercive power over prisoners. And
because the parole decision may be employed in an exemplary fashion, what
in prisoners assumes considerable importance for the decision-maker are the
symbols of compliance.
The exemplary character of parole board decision-making draws its
coercive force from uncertainty. Prisoners, parole boards, judges, the public,
and the mass media all measure punishment in terms of the extent to which
an offender is deprived of liberty. How long someone is to be confined is a
much more important part of punishment than where the time is to be
served, despite the fact that there can be an enormous disparity in the quality
of life between, say, a maximum security penitentiary and a minimum security
prison farm. Furthermore, though imprisonment is an unpleasant matter for
most inmates, loss of liberty is fundamental to all the other deprivations
prisoners must suffer.' 23 In this context, parole means release from an
unpleasant condition before release need legally be granted. And while it is
a grant of that most widely valued good in a democratic society-personal
liberty-parole is discretionary release. It is selective in terms of who is to
be released, and when in the sentence release takes effect.
Over the years methods of managing the behavior of prisoners have
gradually shifted from the application of various physical punishments to
the adoption of measures threatening to reduce further the prisoners' already
substantially restricted liberty. 'With the greater relaxation of prison regimes
in general, however, and increasing use of the less overtly physical methods
of security and control, prison staff have been led to depend more and more
upon the active co-operation of their inmates actually to run the prisons.
Prisons today work because of this often uneasy co-existence.
Though denial of privileges is still employed as a sanction for a variety
of minor institutional transgressiofis, the more important punishments now
employed are connected with security re-classification, transfer, and the loss
of time on the sentence which might otherwise be remitted, either by
withdrawal of good time or denial of parole. Indeed, both remission and to
an extent parole originated as systems to control inmate behavior and
population levels. 24 Security status and transfer are, like the denial of
privileges, sanctions which affect the quality of daily life in prison, making
the pains of imprisonment more distressing. 25 Both are potentially significant
sanctions in their own right: Security status encroaches on a prisoner's liberty

123. G. Sykes & S. Messinger, The Inmate Social System, in R. Cloward, et at., supra
note 117, at 5.
124. K. Hawkins, supra note 68; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 72.
125. G. Sykes, supra note 117.
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in the prison, while transfer determines where prisoners will actually continue
serving their sentence, an important matter for many who value visits from
family and friends. Both sanctions are also significant, however, in their
potential implications for the parole decision, for a decision to release may
be directly contingent upon them. For instance, in some states prisoners have
been treated as either not eligible for parole by virtue of being in punitive
segregation, or at least not eligible to be heard during the period of
segregation (like the case of Lewis Bolden at the beginning of this discussion).
In other cases, a grant of parole may be indirectly contingent upon a transfer
decision, as when a badly-behaved prisoner is sent off to a maximum security
institution where there may be no "relevant" programs for the prisoner's
"problems," and therefore little or no opportunity for him to present parole
board members with grounds for release.
The extra loss of liberty through forfeiture of good time is regarded by
parole board members and prison officials alike as a more serious matter
than security reclassification or transfer. Loss of good time, however, remains
a less potent sanction than a parole denial. The prevailing practice is to grant
good time as a matter of routine at the beginning of a sentence and to
withdraw it only for conspicuously bad behavior. Prisoners consequently
expect to be granted their good time as a matter of course, and do not
regard it as a privilege to be earned. Parole (except perhaps where formal
guidelines are employed) cannot, in contrast, be taken for granted. 26 Besides,
good time lost can always be restored, and quite often is, wholly or partly.
Any good time normally affects a smaller proportion of the total sentence
than parole (usually one third, sometimes one half); eligibility for parole,
depending on the particular type of sentencing structure employed, may
remain possible over the whole or at least the major part of a maximum
term.127
Parole is thus a much more problematic matter for prisoners than good
time. In relatively low-discretion jurisdictions, or those with relatively low
paroling rates (like Hamilton or England or Wales), whether prisoners will
be granted parole is the crucial question. In high-discretion and/or highparole-rate jurisdictions, where prisoners have a reasonable expectation of
being paroled at some point in their sentences, they cannot be sure when
they will be released. Whatever the particular sentencing structure employed,
however, not to be paroled may be a cruel blow to a prisoner, because
parole normally affects a larger proportion of the term to be served than

126. This statement would have been less true in the sixties and early seventies when some
states, like California, Minnesota, and Washington employed sentencing structures with maximum terms so high that release on parole was for almost all prisoners the only way in which
they could realistically expect to leave prison. Many such sentencing structures fell victim to the
recent reforms introduced in the movement towards so-called "just deserts" (or determinate,
or presumptive) sentencing. See F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); K. Hawkins, supra note 40.
127. In those jurisdictions where the statute announces no minimum term to be served the
parole board has in theory complete discretion up to the maximum as to the term to be served.
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good time and because most prisoners naturally cling to hopes of getting out
early, however unrealistic these hopes may seem to others. It is this which
presents parole board members with a potent source of authority.' 28
The use of parole-boards' discretionary leeway derives its effectiveness
as a control mechanism from the simple fact that most people who are
locked up would prefer not to be. As the warden of a large, maximum
security institution in Madison put it:
They release, that is the parole board, they parole a number of men
every month from this facility ...

now this gives us a tool as

managers of this large prison to use and capitalize on, that is that
very strong desire for freedom.
The preservation of a sense of hope of release in the inmate population, he
continued, is a major management tool:
:

..

there's a kind of hope out there. [The prisoner] almost has an

instinctive tendency to act for that ray of hope in a positive fashion.
Even some of the most difficult prisoners I've known over the
years-that is, difficult-to-manage prisoners-have retained that ray
of hope.
Parole boards may seek to preserve the sense of hope and may accordingly
adjust their tolerances by being more willing to release prisoners in institutions for long-termers than they would if such prisoners were held elsewhere,
and in general by avoiding a reduction in release rates. The same warden
had this to say about the consequences of a shift to a less liberal releasing
policy:
Warden:
I think initially-it would lead to a more depressed prisoner population. It would get at that ray of hope....
There just isn't any ray of hope at the end of the tunnel.
If that persisted long enough then I think you'd have the
potential for more outpouring of this frustration either
through minor disturbances or major disturbances. Maybe
like food-"We'll not eat," type of thing, "We're not
going to work," type of thing. And that is always the
potential for a major disturbance in the institution. To
me the key is that ray of hope. ...
Hawkins:
And in practical terms for the board that means keeping
a nice predictable steady turnover of the population;
keeping

. . .

the exit door opening, fairly regularly?

128. The more indeterminate the sentencing structure, the stronger the authority of the parole
board members will be. Under the old indeterminate sentence regimes now in decline, imprisonment in generous quantities was routinely specified by statutes for unexceptional offenses in an
effort to allow for the conspicuously bad case. The way in which parole boards coped with this
authority was a factor contributing to the powerful criticisms of indeterminate sentencing and
parole in the seventies. K. Hawkins, supra note 40.
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Yeah. In terms of our current sentencing structure, yes.
Yeah, I think that's an acknowledged statement.

The problem of managing institutions is regarded as one of increasing
difficulty, however, owing to a deterioration in the tractability of prisoners.
"There's more acting out," one Madison board member observed with a
certain nostalgia:
...more over-rebelliousness than there ever was when I was in the
prison. We used to have a nucleus of older, real criminals, real
convicts, beautifully behaved. So as an administrator they really
helped make the job easy. There weren't nearly as many gang rapes,
gang robberies .... They had their football pools and they gambled,

and they broke rules, but non-violent sorts of things. And now
you're getting . . . people who react in the prison just exactly as
they reacted in the streets .... [Y]ou've been with us, you've seen
some of these guys . . .that are bad dudes, as they say. They are

basically anti-social, assaultive, rough, and they don't give a damn
for society or conformity or whatever. Now, you got a kid that's
trying to make it in prison and is really serious and wants to go
home, he has a helluva time.
Prisoners, however, remain obsessed with "getting out": "Inmates want out,
and most of them will lie, smile, or grovel to get out."'1 29 "The parole board
is an important group in every prisoner's mind in this institution, and
throughout the system," said the warden of Madison's largest maximum
security prison:
Every man who enters the institution is interested in release. That's
the uppermost thought in the prisoner's mind in the institution. Now
this is reinforced as time goes on by other prisoners because monthly
the board is here to meet two or three times. They're seeing men
not only parole but discharge. This is also intensified by the visiting
situation, where the families-be it the wife, mother, girlfriend, or
relatives ...

or friends-are also talking about "when you get out."

The sorts of conduct that parole boards feel compelled to sanction or
reward all reflect the primary issue of control. There is a rich range of
misconduct that parole boards normally sanction, including sexual or other
physical assault on other prisoners; violence to prison guards; smuggling;
possession of weapons or of contraband (such as drugs or gambling paraphernalia), or of other items that seem trivial but are often treated very
seriously by board members as possible evidence of illicit activity. Other
misconduct includes "disruptive" behavior, being out-of-place, gambling,
and verbal abuse to the staff. Escape is the most serious of the commoner
forms of misconduct, because it represents an actual as well as a symbolic
loss of control by the institution. This is particularly so in maximum-security

129. D. Jackson, supra note 122, at 61.
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prisons, for it makes public their vulnerability. Conduct classified as escape
varies enormously, embracing everything from those rare cases where a
prisoner "goes over the top," to the much commoner (if less glamorous)
absconding from an outside working party or failing to return from home
leave. Many escapes are prosecuted as new crimes; they also invite heavy
administrative sanctions apart from the denial of parole. In addition to
punishing a breach of institutional rules, parole boards also penalize indifference, laziness, or other failure to engage in treatment programs they deem
appropriate to a prisoner's "problems."
Boards not only look at the prisoner's misconduct but also the punishment imposed by the institution, for this is taken as a good indicator of the
gravity of the rulebreaking. Prison sanctions depend upon an inmate's
security status and location in the institution. These are, however, relative
notions, board members according institutional misconduct variable significance depending on the prison in which an inmate is held. For the parole
board a disciplinary report in one institution may be a much graver matter
than the same kind of ticket awarded in another. And in some institutions,
the gravity of a prisoner's conduct will be visibly displayed to the parole
board if the prisoner is disqualified by virtue of his prison disciplinary record
from appearing before the board, or if he enters the hearing room .in
handcuffs or chains.
One consequence of sanctioning institutional misconduct by denial of
parole is a kind of double jeopardy. The prisoner has already been punished
for his violation of the institutional rules and is now punished again for the
same misconduct. This is another fact of the cumulative, compounding
effects produced by labelling in the criminal justice system; similarly the
prisoner with a disciplinary record is more likely to be reported for subsequent prison rule-breaking than the person without such a record.'13 Administrative values take precedence here over legal values. Board members
willingly acknowledge that this double punishment is a consequence of their
decisions, while defending the practice on the grounds that the interests of
institutional management simply do not permit them to overlook misconduct.
The prisoner who seeks to abide by the rules of the prison is not,
however, necessarily in an advantageous position so far as the parole board
is concerned. Whereas poor conduct deserves to be sanctioned, good conduct
is regarded as the norm and is not, itself, deserving of release (despite the
encouragement given by board members to good behavior). And particularly
compliant behavior risks being characterized unfavorably by board members
as mere evidence of a prisoner who is "prisonwise" or Who has "learned
how to do time." This is particularly the case if the inmate's crime is
especially disreputable. Apart from conformity with the rules, parole boards
routinely expect hard work and participation in prison programs. (This is
less a matter of involvement in treatment than evidence of the game-like
bargaining that parole boards engage in with prisoners.) Conspicuo sly good

130. E. Poole & R. Regoli, supra note 34.
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behavior of a certain kind, however, may sometimes be rewarded. For
instance, assisting the authorities is often-but not always-rewarded with a
parole. A tip-off about an escape, or help to an officer in trouble may be
regarded as courageous, but may also be regarded as self-serving. Assistance
to staff will be favorably viewed if the board is confident that it was
"genuine." In the following Madison case, the prisoner had been sentenced
to five to ten years for rape and assault to rape. He had been refused twice,
for twelve months and nine months. He also had a number of tickets and
was in segregation. Except for the fact that the prisoner had been refused
twice (which tends of itself to predispose towards greater leniency in subsequent hearings), most of the features in his case were pointing towards a
parole denial.
Myra Levin was reading out loud the list of the man's tickets and
was interrupted by the prisoner's Correctional Counselor who interjected that the man had recently come to the aid of a guard. "An
officer was in trouble and he went down the hall and got help.
That's why he's over here." [In segregation, under protection.] Mrs.
Levin went on to talk about the extent to which the prisoner was a
danger to women, concluding by asking for a psychological evaluation. She announced her position by saying, "I'm leaning to parole.
There's the incident where he came to someone's help. He's made
some gains." The case had to be referred to Executive Session for
lack of favorable votes-doubtless a reflection of the crime and
institutional record-but the panel appeared to be favorably disposed
to the prisoner.
Characterizations of "truth," "genuineness," or "sincerity" are fundamental to decisions in legal contexts, and judging prison conduct is no exception
to this. There are sometimes striking examples of the precariousness of the
interpretative work in this context. Consider the following example from
1 31
California:
An inmate I know once helped an officer (after he requested the
aid) who was being beaten by two other inmates. When the Good
Samaritan went before the Parole Board he was informed that it
was decidedly abnormal for one inmate to help an officer against
two other inmates; why had he done so? The man told the Adult
Authority member, Mr. Madden, that it had seemed the decent thing
to do. Madden decried this motive and suggested that the man was
so violence-prone that he even stepped in where he normally did not
belong. Four years later the man is still incarcerated, and he has had
three fights with friends of the men whom he fought. Staff seem
not to care.

131. R. Hyland, Diagnosis: Extreme Alienation, in R. MINTON (ed.), INSIDE: PRISON
AMERICAN STYLE 51 (1971) (emphasis in the original).
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Precariousness is sometimes evident where board members encounter cases
that appear to them to have been engineered by prisoners to give the
impression of helping the staff or the institution. Board members often lack
procedures by which to discern the credibility of one view of the prisoner's
conduct, rather than another.
Dan Johnson was describing in an Executive Session of the Madison
board the case he had recently heard of a prisoner who committed
two robberies four months after being paroled from a robbery. He
had 25 tickets. "A lieutenant came into the room for the first time
in 30 years to support the man's parole. He did something for the
institution which has to be of great help for the institution." Johnson
continues, now quoting from the file, " 'A bunch of keys was lost
and the inmate was instrumental in retrieving the keys within 1 1/2
hours of their loss. Without these keys large parts of the institution
would be insecure and would have necessitated the changing of many
locks.' " Cal Smith responded by recalling the case of another prisoner who turned in a gun and was paroled, but described him as a
hustler who set it up. The board members argued as to whether the
present case had also been set up, finally concluding that it had not
and deciding to parole in six months.

The Ticket
Getting out, not surprisingly, is a pervasive theme of parole hearings.
Two of the recurrent images that prisoners elaborate upon in hearings is
"life out there" and "going home". Equally pervasive, however, and very
often linked by board members to the topic of going home, is the question
of the prisoner's conduct during his incarceration, a matter also accorded
substantial prominence in reports received by the parole board. It is likely
to be commented on, especially if it is untoward, not simply by custodial
staff but by many of those supplying evidence and assessments about the
prisoner and his suitability for release. In some states the record of any
institutional infraction is reproduced together with the sanction imposed so
that board members can see for themselves what the inmate is alleged to
have done. Information in the file about prison misconduct, in particular, is
designed to be salient and easily retrievable. In Eastern State, for example,
it is presented as the "warden's card" to the board at the beginning of the
day's hearings (and so remains the one source of absolutely up-to-date
documentary information), while in Western State and Madison the prisonconduct record is reproduced on paper of a different color making it
immediately accessible among the many other reports in a typically bulky
file.
Prison behavior is especially weighty in parole decisions because whatever
the fundamental approach to decision-making adopted, there is agreement
that the conerns of management must be protected. The interests of the
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rationalist or positivist parole board members are shared by their colleagues
who operate with a moral or classical approach to decision-making (in which
the imposition of commensurate punishment for a criminal act is the central
value). The result is that from their very different starting points very similar
outcomes may be produced, because prison misconduct means something
significant to each of them.
In interpreting the meaning of the ticket the positivist sees it as evidence
of "lack of adjustment," indicating a continuation of the "problems" that
brought the inmate to prison in the first place. The ticket is testimony to a
continuing pathology, whose only cure is "more time." A series of tickets,
according to this viewpoint, is evidence of a serious "failure of adjustment,"
which is further secured by the assumption that such failure is predictive of
failure outside.3 2 In certain cases decision-makers find such positivist assumptions about misconduct persuasive, especially if clear links can be
perceived between conduct prior to and during imprisonment. If, with all
the constraints of imprisonment, the positivist assumption runs, misbehavior
in prison seems to be part of an enduring and unbroken pattern, what
likelihood is there that there will be any change in the future? Such persistence
suggests to the positivist at best lack of change (or "poor judgment" as
some of the Hamilton board call it), at worst a persistent pathology:
Hal Brandon:
Carter, Apparently, is a serious behavioral problem.
[Board secretary]
Jorge Martinez:
[Chairman]

We really shouldn't be hearing him now, he's already lost
90 days.

Brandon:

Well, it's either a case of seeing him now or putting him
off and making him think you're setting him up for
parole.

Martinez:

This kid is very bad. He tried to assault the Captain at
[the Reformatory]. His crime was assault on a policeman
and there's a previous case of assault in his record.

Brandon:

There's a psych.

Martinez:

Yeah, it's negative. [The psychiatric evaluation ends: "It
would seem to me that it would be rather difficult for
the -board to consider releasing him in view of his recently
negative behavior and the absence of any clear cut indicators of his attempts to cope. . . ." (my emphasis).]

[Carter enters the hearing room and responds to the Chairman's
opening question about his prison conduct]: "I'm in segregation 'cause

132. In Madison this is supported by the institutional parole prediction tables, which
(uniquely, so far as I am aware) show prison conduct to have some predictive power.
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I can't handle population. I been paranoid since I been
in here."
Martinez:

The record shows you use that word a lotta times. What
does "paranoid" mean to you?

Carter:

I can't do anything without shaking. I walk around and
I can't stop shaking.... I been hearing voices and stuff.
That's why I hit the Captain with the chair.

Martinez:

Were you trying to prove to him that you had something
wrong with you?

Carter:

I dunno what was happening. [He goes on to explain his
arrest at length, stressing police provocation and brutality.] I been in this jail a year. It might not seem a long
time to some people, but I know I ain't coming back.
I'm gonna get me a job and live like one of them citizens.
I just can't handle it here ....
I can't handle the situation.

[The discussion moves on to Carter's drinking habits, his use of
drugs and his plans on release. As the hearing begins to wind up he
acknowledges, "I don't have much for you, it's true," and, subsequently, "When I look back I can't believe what a mess I madeloafing around and goofing up."]
Martinez:

[After Carter has left the hearing room:] "Oh boy, boy.
There's no question we gotta deny him ....
Y'know, if
he'd come here with just something ....
He's got to get
a hold of himself or he's gonna do a lotta time. The same
thing would happen again today if that officer were to
try and arrest him. ...

[After a few more brief comments with Jessica Moran (another
member of the panel), Martinez decides on another hearing in a
year's time together with a psychiatric evaluation because of the
violence of Carter's offense and his persistently poor conduct in the
institution, including, Martinez notes, an assault on a correctional
officer very similar to his earlier behavior. "He has a real problem
with authority," Martinez says to Brandon, who is noting the board's
reasons as Martinez dictates them. "He lacks judgment, lacks responsibility. Here's another reason-he hasn't done anything positive
during his period of incarceration ....
If he did shape up, we'd
probably parole him next time round, so I'd recommend some
involvement, some more education."
When Carter is told, he simply exclaims "Next September]" To this
Martinez replies, "This behavior compares with your behavior outside." A Hamilton case.]
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The chairman's reasoning in this case seems clear enough. Though young
("a kid"), Carter is regarded with suspicion because his assaultive behavior
in the institution can be persuasively linked with his prior conduct to suggest
that he is a prisoner who is violent and who "has a real problem with
authority" (diagnosis), whose recent behavior suggests persistence, for the
"same thing would happen" (prediction). The decision is clear ("no question"). What the board will be looking for to change its verdict next year is
for Carter to "shape up." Ideally, the positivist requirement is that he should
involve himself in the program in the hope of acquiring a sense of responsibility, but the absolute minimum clearly implied is that there should be an
improvement in Carter's prison conduct, which will serve to weaken the link
with his earlier assaultive ways, thereby making possible a different prediction
of his future behavior. The bad impression formed by the prison misconduct
can be mitigated to an extent by better behavior and preferably by some
more positive signs in the form of involvement in prison programs. These
signs are important because of their capacity to cancel contrary signs ("if
he'd come here with just something").
Fundamentally, however, the issue is one of predictive relevance. As a
board member said in response to my question why tickets were important,
"Because they tell me .

. .'if

you cannot follow the rules in here, where

you're under pretty constant supervision, and the rules are very well defined,
how are you ever going to follow parole rules?' " This is decision-making
firmly aligned with a positivist approach. Links may be perceived between
the institutional conduct and earlier criminal behavior, and the decisionmaker finds it tempting to project continued behavior of a similar kind into
the future. In these circumstances it is rational to deny parole since the risks
associated with release are all too evident, and this rationality can be readily
made clear to others.
Establishing links between past and future, however, is a complex matter
for certain decision-makers:
We look for a continuation of that same type of behavior in the
institution, and misconducts that are similar to that type behavior
are significant to us, see. Out-of-place tickets [are] not necessarily
significant to me-it's with some types of offenders. They would be
with a homosexual ... but not necessarily with an armed robber.
Or a guy ... serving for felonious assault, if ... the tickets that

he gets aren't assaultive in nature, [they] don't bother me all that
much. But if he's pressuring guys and making threats and strongarming guys in the prison... we're looking at a guy who's possibly
doing the same thing he was doing out on the streets. [A Madison
board member.]
These remarks suggest that rule-breaking in the institution is insufficient in
itself to be allied with earlier social rule-breaking. Instead, a tie has to be
made between the type of behavior and the type of offender. Misconduct
that seems something of a discontinuity in the thread of deviance can be
regarded as a less ominous matter. As important to the decision-maker as
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the gravity of the institutional misconduct is the sense of pattern or continuity
it represents. As a colleague of the Madison board member quoted immediately above put it:
...certain kinds of institutional misconduct really don't bother me.
I don't care if they smoke pot. I don't care if they drink spud juice.
I don't care if they gamble in the joint. I really don't; and I see that
maybe they have to do that to survive as a person in these kinds of
places. You know, if they're involved in assaultive behavior in the
institution, I care about it. If I think a pattern of behavior which in
and of itself may not seem serious, is predictive of whether he's
going to be involved in future crime, then I may evaluate it.
Positivist reasoning can be quite subtle, as, for example, in the distinction
made in categorizing events or acts as pathological or situational. A situational misconduct (the more tolerable form) would be regarded as a rational
response to a peculiar and unpleasant environment. A pathological misconduct, on the other hand, is yet another instance of the deviant's problem:
His institutional behavior is treated as representative of his character with
its underlying frailties. In the following remarks by a Madison board member,
note his careful distinction between a "fight" (situational) and an "assault"
(pathological):
... if I ...

read that ticket and it's strictly a fight, that really does

not concern me because I know that some guys have to stand up to
their manhood. Some guys just have to ...

you know, "Stay out

of my face," y'know, "Leave me alone," if it comes to a physical
confrontation. There's fights and then there's assaults. And it's the
fight that's really an assault by a character who's an assaultive
character to begin with. And to me that does relate to his behavior.
The pathological assault is a more serious matter than the situational fight,
then, because it contains the clear implication that, being evidence of real
character, it will continue in the future. This predictive value underpins any
desire to sanction the misconduct for purposes of institutional control.
The Carter case (above) is one of those in which positivist reasoning is
readily apparent. In a substantial number of cases where prison conduct is
a significant feature in the parole decision, however, the issue tends to be
one reasoned in classical punishment terms: A willingness to break the rules
must be punished in the interests of the smooth administration of the prison.
It is what the prisoner deserves. Furthermore it is a symbolic matter.
Judgments about parole release or denial hinge in these circumstances not
on what prison conduct might tell the decision-maker about the kind of
person being judged, but on what meanings and values are implied by a
particular verdict upon a particular inmate. Just as in granting parole to a
convicted prisoner a board is making a powerful symbolic statement of
forgiveness, so in adjudging a badly-behaved prisoner as deserving or not
deserving of parole, the parole board continues to be engaged in the
appearanceof condoning or condemning his prison misconduct:
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I do feel pretty strongly about what does this [ticket] mean to the
rest of the inmate body? And I have offered the argument, "Well,
that ain't all that big a thing," y'know. But what are these other
guys going to think? You're releasing this guy right out of the hole,
out of detention, or out of top lock. At least delay the release date
30 days or something to show the others that you don't do these
sorts of things and still get parole.... [A Madison board member;
his emphasis.]
This aspect of the parole decision, then, is another facet of the exemplary
character of much criminal-justice decision-making. So far as parole boards
are concerned there is great symbolism in the judgment about time for crime,
but great symbolism also surrounding the way the prisoner responds to his
prison environment. Thus serious incidents of misconduct cannot be condoned, while a long record of trouble in prison signifies persistence, which
also cannot be condoned. There is a coincidence in all of this between the
concerns of positivism and classicism, since the misconduct is sanctionable
for the former because it is evidence of a continuing need for treatment, and
for the latter because it is rule-breaking to punish. Carter's case, for example,
is equally understandable in moral and symbolic terms, even though the
reasoning followed positivist lines.
The symbolic issues arise in a particularly explicit form when a prisoner
has been found guilty of misconduct shortly before his parole hearing, for
this violates the precept that "everyone knows" that a prisoner keeps his
nose clean before seeing the board. To do otherwise is to seem utterly
irresponsible:
Hal Brandon (after a hearing): Gee! That jerk! He had a disciplinary
report on 10/5/79 [four days before]. (Reads from file): "Disobeying
a direct order-five days loss of privileges, thirty days loss of good
time, suspended thirty days." He'd done two years without any. [A
Hamilton case.]
What is important to a board, however, is not so much the prisoner
who has no misconduct reports at all, as the prisoner who has had none
since his last hearing, for this display of greater compliance, visible to staff
and inmates alike, is again a conspicuous improvement in behavior to be
rewarded. Something resembling the following snatch of dialogue from a
Hamilton hearing will quite often be heard.
- Any misconducts?
- No. I had one in'77.
- None since you've been denied?
- No.

While it is possible for decision-makers to employ either positivist or
classical rationales in treating the seriousness of institutional misconduct
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where administrative concerns are dominant, there is also an inherent ambiguity. Administrative decision-making can be made to appear rational in
classical terms because those who break rules self-evidently deserve to be
punished. But it can also be made to appear rational in positivist terms
because a series of misconducts (damaging to the smooth running of the
institution) may be presented as a "failure to adjust" and as evidence of a
predicted inability to adjust in the community. The nature and extent of the
relationship between behavior inside prison and behavior on the street,
despite the fact that for years it has been a major resource for parole-board
members to reason by (taking the form "how can we expect you to behave
on the street, when you can't behave in here?") has, however, been subject
to little research. A decision to deny parole on management grounds alone,
however, is hardly ever justified in such terms. The use of parole as an
administrative decision is instead taken for granted as rational and appropriate. The following case may be taken as typical:
A prisoner convicted of larceny from a building, who was up at his
first hearing, was given a parole date six months past his minimum
and told that his adjustment had to be good. He asked what
"adjustment" meant and was told, quite simply, "No tickets. Get
into programing." The member's colleague then tried to emphasize
that the board wanted a clean conduct record. When the prisoner
left the room the first board member observed: "He's lucky he
didn't get a flop [outright refusal]. .

.

. If he gets a ticket or two

we'll max him anyway."
The World of the Prison
The preoccupation among prisoners for getting out, expressed in the
endless imagery in hearings of "outside," and the pervasive concern among
staff to maintain control, makes for two constituencies with the utmost
sensitivity to parole-board work. Whatever parole boards say or do becomes
a topic of considerable concern in the world of the prison.
Parole boards know this. And they have a particular view of the prison,
when decisions have to be made about rewarding or (more likely) sanctioning
prison conduct. Here, ironically, the prison is not the place of treatment or
training envisaged by those whose urge is to reform. Instead the prison is
regarded as a snake-pit. The suspicion and distrust of inmates which seem
typical of staff attitudes to their charges in many total institutions is shared
by parole boards. A prison, whether it be a maximum-security state penitentiary or a minimum-security camp, is for the parole board a tight, highlyregulated, claustrophobic world, a sinister, shadowy, vicious place, peopled
by a collection of outcasts compelled there against their will. The maximum
security prison, in particular, is a place kept precariously under control by
staff continually under pressure, continually confronted by violence and
danger. Prison is a world with its own rules, roles, and life.'
133. Some of the best writing in criminology has been that which has documented the life
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In many American prisons, life is a hard and cruel existence of violence,
forcible sex, drugs, gambling, alcohol ("spud-juice" or "pruno"), and other
illicit activities. In some maximum-security institutions this life is taken for
granted by parole boards as an inevitable consequence of the herding together
of outcasts condemned to confinement for years. It is a life which can
"screw'em up terribly. It really can," said a member of the Madison board,
who spoke from personal experience of working in adult prisons. "I know
that."
[T]he pressure on men is tremendous. There's no place, or time
really, for a man to be alone, y'know, in spite of the fact that he's
locked up ....

[Slometimes frankly they run in gangs in the prisons

and they pressure men for every goddam thing: their money, their
shoes, sex. Y'know, it can be.

.

. devastating....

In this world, matters which might otherwise be regarded as of minor
importance come to acquire major significance. Failure to observe some of
the regulations of the institution (for example, wearing the wrong clothes)
can acquire an ominous significance for the parole board. Falling asleep at
work is, in prison, punishable activity:
Hal Brandon:

He lost 10 days in April.

Debbie Herr:

He's a very good tutor.

Brandon:

He lost 10 days for falling asleep on the job. (Reading
from the institutional report): "I found him sound asleep
in the tool store." [A Hamilton case.]
Prison as the context in which such decisions must be made can cast a
sinister meaning on what might be regarded in other circumstances as
unexceptional, as Carter's case suggests. Thus disobeying a direct order is a
grave matter, as in the case where a prisoner disobeyed an order to move a
heavy object in the prison gymnasium. He was punished by the institution
even though he had been excused from such activity on medical grounds.
On the other hand, many inmates claim to feel compelled to protect
their reputations and their sense of personal integrity. They accordingly
present the viciousness of prison in mitigation of their misconduct. Prisoners
have a good idea of how parole boards think and employ a variety of
counter-strategies to present themselves to the board in as blameless a light
as possible. In this respect the inmate in a total institution is not totally
without power-especially if the releasing authority has to parole a steady
number to maintain some control over population levels in its institutions.

of penal institutions. See D. CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY (1940); E. GOFFMAN, supra note
119; G. SYKES, supra note 117; and the collections of papers in R. CLOWARD, et al., supra note
117; D. CPESSEY, infra note 156; J. JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY
(1977); L. HAZELRIGO, PRISON WITHIN SOCIETY: A READER IN PENOLOGY (1968); N. JOHNSTON,
L. SAVITZ, & M. WOLFGANG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION (2d ed. 1970).
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Many of the strategies employed by prisoners hinge on some view of the
prison as a place of irresistible pressure:
Inmate:

.

Dean Akers:

What d'ya go to the hole for?

Inmate:

Fighting. Then I lost my job.

..

I went to the hole.

[Akers reads aloud the two tickets from the file. In the fight, the
inmate is reported to have knocked another prisoner to the ground,
then to have kicked him, with the help of other prisoners.]
Inmate:

I'm doing a lotta time. This is a very abnormal situation.
And there's a lotta racial tension ....
There's a lotta
things here go on where people are abused ....
I thought
I had to stand on my own two feet, rather than go out
on the street all screwed up by my experiences in here....
Rather than be pushed around or slapped around by
someone, I'd therefore be beaten up ...

[The prisoner was denied a year, a board member telling him to use
his "brain, not brawn."] [A Jefferson case.]
These comments give the impression of an inmate who is accounting for his
untoward behavior by appealing to qualities which in a context outside the
prison would be regarded as virtues. He wants to stand on his "own two
feet." More importantly he claims he behaved aggressively in the interests
of his own rehabilitation, so that he would not go back on the street "all
screwed up."
The same ploy can also be used to explain failure on the street when a
prisoner is readmitted as a parole violator and the question arises of how
much more time he must serve:
The only people I knew were people from the joint. I learned about
drugs in the pen, it's a good way of killing time ... you got to go
in front of the parole board or the classification committee-it's a
good way. It's easier if you're fucked up ... it helps kill the
time ....
I do beautiful in the institution. I've only had one writeup in my whole time. [A Jefferson case.]
Prisoners frequently claim harassment as a major cause of misconduct.
One, for example, gave evidence against another and had his life threatened.
Having spent time in administrative segregation, he was still having difficulty
with other prisoners. "The people over in F block now, they harass me,
man. Like they call me 'snitchy' and things." The prisoner's most recent
misconduct (a month before) occurred when another inmate threw a tray of
food into his cell, which prompted him to retaliate by doing the same thing
to his assailant. This kind of case presents a dilemma to the board-it wishes
to sanction misconduct, but is faced by a prisoner who claims his misbehavior

1216

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1161

is a consequence in effect of his co-operating with the authorities. On this
occasion the prisoner was paroled.
Some prisoners exploit this dilemma by committing misconducts, they
claim, to forestall worse behavior.
Jerry Gordon (to an inmate who had had a sex misconduct and had
lost five days for fighting): You have some misconducts. What's
your excuse for that?
Inmate:

I was scared to be on the galleries.

Gordon:

But why would you insult people?

Inmate:

To go to the box [punitive segregation].

Gordon:

(Asks about the sexual misconduct.)

Inmate:

I don't make advances here.

Gordon:

Where do you?

Inmate:

On the street. I'm a bisexual. People don't like homosexuals or bisexuals or snitches. My partner told people I
was a snitch the first day I got in here.

[Later Debbie Herr returns to the same theme. The inmate said that
people had been spitting into his cell, throwing water and urine into
his cell and onto his bed.]
Herr:

I know there are lots of problems about serving time, but
there are a lot of young men in this institution who
manage to do time without your difficulties. Don't you
think there's something about your personality that leads
you into these difficulties?

Inmate:

People don't like a homosexual.

Gordon:

(Later returns with a question: "Do you consider yourself
aggressive and disruptive?")

Inmate:

When I have to be ....

If someone takes a swing at you

in here you can't walk away or you'll get called a punk.
[After further discussion the board reaches a decision, Gordon telling
the prisoner: "There are some unresolved areas of behavior pattern
that we'd like some clarification on. Meanwhile please try and stay
out of trouble."] [A Hamilton case.]
Prisoners do not always suggest, however, that the pressure comes from
other inmate$, Some try the riskier strategy of complaining that they are
being picked on by particular guards. Boards find this an easier problem to
handle. Whereas all prisoners share a discredited moral status, guards do
not. Plausible accusations can accordingly be levelled at one prisoner by
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another; but where a guard is the target, the accusation rebounds to the
prisoner's detriment, becoming implausible and merely more evidence of his
own manipulativeness, disreputability or, in some cases, of his paranoia.
The Meaning of the Ticket
The tendency in board members to expect good prison conduct as the
norm presents inmates with the practical problem of how they display "good
conduct." One tactic which has been observed is to behave badly on arrivalto "screw up"-then to "settle down.' 3 4 This provides the decision-maker
with conspicuous evidence of "change" for the better. This confers rationality upon the decision. For the educated, intelligent, or skilled prisoners, or
those who otherwise cannot be regarded as in "need" of institutional
treatment or training programs (a relatively rare category), improved conduct
is one of the very few criteria of change open to them to display for symbolic
reward by the parole board.
Prisoners do not have a great deal available to them as resources for
influencing parole-board decisions. There are institutional programs of various kinds directed towards correction of "problems" or "needs." These
are, however, often lacking in some institutions, and some inmates cannot
readily be defined as in need of certain kinds of prison programs. 35 The
only resource accessible to all inmates, in fact, as a criterion of change,
desert, or accomplishment is their institutional conduct. It is particularly
important as a criterion also because it is recent evidence of the deviant's
behavior and presumed ability to live by the rules.
It is in the context of a holding institution that the meaning of the ticket
has to be appreciated. The nature of each institution generates its own set
of expectations in board members as to where to expect "trouble" as well
as what kinds of trouble to expect. For example, in a minimum-security
institution, an absconding, while treated seriously, is not regarded as the
grave matter that an escape from a more secure prison is (as the difference
in vocabulary suggests). In large maximum-security institutions, on the other
hand, the physical arrangements, staffing problems, composition and crowding of the inmate body all conspire to produce an impression that violence
and viciousness are commonplace. Paradoxically, however, such misconduct
is likely to be treated the more seriously if it occurs in conditions of lesser
security.
The issue of consistency arises in particular with the different meanings
tickets possess in different institutions. In Madison, for example, in the
reformatory
where you have several hundred youthful aggressive offenders housed
in an overcrowded situation where they can't move without bumping

134. See D. Ward,
dissertation, University
135. One prisoner
Alcoholics Anonymous

"Prison Rule Enforcement and Changing Organizational Goals," Ph.D.
of Illinois, 1960.
who did not drink but nevertheless insisted on going to his prison
sessions was regarded by his parole board as rather odd.
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into one another, it's inevitable that you're going to have fights, and
so you get tickets. And you might put those same guys out on a
camp situation where they're not crowded like that and they might
not get the tickets.
The ticket has to be evaluated, then, for its meaning in the context of the
prison, quite apart from what it may reveal about the prisoner. Not only do
structural features in the prison vary, but their staffs are recognized as
having different approaches to institutional control. Some wardens, a member of the Madison board remarked, follow a policy of "don't be writing
up a ticket every time you turn around. This is a situation you should be
able to handle on the spot with a reprimand or an understanding talk with
the guy." But, he continued, "young officers I've heard say, in some of
these institutions, 'If I don't write tickets, they don't think I'm doing my
job.' " This board member thus recognizes that the ticket is the outcome of
organizfibnal activity which can be employed by superiors as an index of
productivity and commitment. Boards must not only know their institutions,
they must know their staffs.
When perspectives, positivist and neoclassical, differ, yet agree that
prison misconduct must mean something, tickets can be treated as significant
in a number of ways. The gravity of the behavior involved in the misconduct
is a signal for concern. One ticket alone, if it is an escape or an escape
attempt, or an assault on a guard, may well be enough to encourage the
board to sanction the misconduct by denial. A persistent pattern of misconduct will also cause anxieties. In determining persistence board members will
organize time to create a career of misconduct, 3 6 linking a prisoner's past
conduct with the present in a continuity of view. This is a procedure familiar
to prisoners as well as board members. In the following dialogue from a
case in Madison, the prisoner was a 35-year-old convicted of attempted
felonious assault. Jack Collins remembered him from a previous encounter:
Collins:

You used to box, didn't you? (Noticing tickets in the file)
Oh, oh. You used to fight, but you still do, don't you!
There was a fight in March, and another in May. Two
months apart. ...

Myra Levin:

You had a few tickets when you first came in here. Why?

Inmate:

Back at that time I was growing into maturity, man, see?

Collins:

Two fighting tickets since the last flop is real bad. (Further
dialogue establishes that the man had been knifed in a
fight in the institution in the last year.)

136. See J. ROTH, TIMETABLES: STRUCTURING THE PASSAGE OF TIME IN HOSPITAL TREATMENT
AND OTHER CAREERS (1963).
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Levin (to
Collins):

He's very high risk [a statistical category in the data
supplied to the board]. We gotta take it back [to discuss
further at Executive Session]. (to Inmate): I really think
it'll be another flop, but I can't say whether it'll be
another year or not.

Inmate:

But what can I do? I got only two [tickets] in the last
four years. (He goes on to claim the fighting was only
horseplay.)

Collins:

There's no such thing as horseplay.

Here, the suggestion of the violent inmate is established with reference to
"a fight in March, and another in May." The significance of this for the
board is that those dates are too close and too recent. "Two months apart"
suggests persistence and commitment. Levin also establishes that the man
had "a few tickets when he first came in," which the prisoner takes as an
opportunity to display himself as changed: "I was growing into maturity."
After all, he has "got only two in the last four years." However, there is
also the matter of the gravity of the recent fighting misconducts, as Collins
observes: "Two fighting tickets since the last flop is real bad." The time
structure in the reference to "since the last flop" also signals a view of the
gravity of the tickets: the prisoner should have known better than to have
incurred misconducts having already been refused parole.
Inmates know this rule of the game and will try to play down their
misconduct or neutralize the impression of culpability where they can. The
following discussion took place in a Madison prison with a first termer who
had lost 45 days good time:
Carl Mayer:

You sure got a helluva burden of tickets.

Inmate:

I can't justify that. I ain't done time before. I just didn't
know how to handle that.

Mayer:

But it's what the tickets imply. It's an attitude.

Inmate:

I was goin' through a kinda phase. Things just came
down on me.

Mayer:

When was your last ticket?

Inmate:

May 10-but that was the first for four months.

[The board members then engaged in the following dialogue in the
prisoner's presence (and doubtless for his benefit) in reaching a
decision.]
Mayer:

I'm afraid the adjustment's been that poor.

Dan Johnson:

It's too bad, I hate to max out a young guy, but, hell,
30 tickets! And you sound pretty good today-and some
of them have been pretty aggressive.

Inmate:

I'd hate to max out.
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But all you can do is try to earn back as much good time
as possible.

[Then, turning to the writing of the report on the hearing, Mayer
continued: "The inmate has two convictions and during incarceration
has incurred many misconduct reports and has not given the parole
board assurances it needs to parole."]
Johnson:

(By way of explanation of the decision to me after the
inmate had left the room): "Nature of tickets with nature
of crime".
The board's apparent reluctance to turn the prisoner down is evident:
He was a first termer, and a youth when the crimes were committed, both
features regularly being treated as mitigating, hence G.F.'s remark, "I hate
to max out a young guy." He was also sounding "pretty good" at his
hearing. For his part the prisoner had not "done time before," so he did
not "know how to handle that." And he could claim an interruption of
four months before his last ticket, in the hope that the board would treat
that as evidence of a change for the better. In fact, the board members'
reluctance about refusing parole is probably as much apparent as real or
ironic; expressions of regret, after all, serve as a way of "cooling out" the
prisoner.'37 In the first place the inmate had "a helluva burden of tickets."
Secondly, and more ominously for him, "It's what the tickets imply. It's an
attitude." In other words, Mayer was prepared to articulate a positivist view
that there is predictive relevance in the tickets; a position endorsed by
Johnson with his linking of "nature of tickets with nature of crime." Mayer,
as the prisoner had sensed, was probably searching for a sign of change
when asking when the prisoner's last ticket was. It was two months before,
though as the inmate hastened to point out, it was the first for four months.
Board members normally prefer not to have such recent tickets, and recency
in this case was the more sinister given the thirty or so tickets this prisoner
had amassed.
In confronting cases of institutional misconduct, the prisoner's ticket is
treated by the board as reliable evidence (indeed all reports from official
sources are generally invested with an aura of reliability). With few exceptions, institutional records of misconduct are treated as accurate, as possessing a concrete, definitive quality. Prisoners, however, often have denials or
other explanations for their misconduct which are totally at odds with the
account in the record. Since the prisoner occupies a discredited moral status,
board members find it extremely difficult wholly or even partly to accept his
version of reality: To do so would impugn the integrity of institutional staff
involved either as recorders of the misconduct or occasionally as victims of
it. And the prisoner who does challenge the record runs precisely that risk.

137. E. Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure, 15
PSYCHIATRY

451 (1952).
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This says more to the board member about the prisoner than about the staff.
Since board members have to rely on a written account of controversial
incidents which are not tried by procedures of any great formality, and since
they routinely expect prisoners to attempt by whatever means to play down
the alleged misconduct, they draw inferences from the written record about
the gravity of the misconduct, a practice which confers a substantial authority
upon those institutional staff who have a direct input to the documents going
to the parole board. If emphasis is needed they can also take advantage of
the personal contact which occurs when the board visits the institution. "I've
done that," said the warden of a large prison in Madison:
in terms of-maybe discussing a case with the board saying, "Look
at this type of behavior in the institution." That's done in several
ways, that can be done from the standpoint of the man's involvement
in difficulties in the institution by simply putting reports in the
file ....
Where I see certain things in the institution I'll put "Parole
not recommended." That's saying to the board that I, as Warden,
am not supporting this particular case.
Hawkins:

And when the Warden of a major institution like this
says that, presumably the board will go along?

Warden:

I would think so, yes (laughs).

In these circumstances, a parole board is as much ratifying a decision already
reached by others as it is making a decision of its own (and in any discussion
about the decision members would make they tend to focus on whether or
not they should accept a recommendation, rather than whether they should
release a prisoner). Board members realise, however, that in receiving the
views and reports of institutional staff they confront the problem of consistency and commensurability in justice.
The issue of commensurability becomes significant when boards address
the gravity of the institutional misconduct in the context of institutional
sanctions already applied. This is an important matter for board members.
Some inquire in minute detail into the wording of a ticket for a sense of the
gravity of the misconduct, for if it is a minor matter it can be left with
whatever sanction the institutional staff will have imposed. Indeed the
institutional sanction is itself carefully noted as a means of penetrating the
typically terse misconduct reports which find their way into the prisoner's
file. As with the prisoner's original crime, it is crucially important for the
board to know "what actually happened." An invariable relationship is
assumed between the gravity of the institutional sanction and the gravity of
the misconduct. This leads to an unfortunate irony, so far as the prisoner is
concerned, for the more serious the infraction is judged to be by virtue of
its sanction, the greater the likelihood of its being punished further by the
parole board by denial or deferral of parole over and above the sanction
already imposed by the institution.
The use of institutional sanctioning practices as an index of gravity is
suggested in the following case from Hamilton:
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An inmate serving three to seven on assault first (shooting and
injuring a fifteen year old boy) had some disciplinaries the previous
year, including one (he denied) in which he was alleged to have
thrown a water bag at an officer. Hal Brandon read the most salient
details out to the rest of the board before the prisoner entered,
listing the misconducts together with the sanctions, concluding: "So
in substance he got a two-week loss of recreation for all of this. The
words 'attempted assault' look a lot more serious than the ticket
does." The prisoner was later given a short denial partly because of
his "poor judgment ... as evidenced by his tickets," as the board's
written reasons put it.
Here, it seems the board secretary draws the conclusion that despite the
apparent repetition of violence, the trivial sanction imposed by the institution
indicates misconduct that is not serious. Boards are willing to rely on the
institutional staff's view about the appropriateness of their sanction because,
being closer to the action and having the keenest possible concern for control,
they know best. Besides, the boards' abiding concern with the symbolism of
their activities does not permit them to make decisions which are interpretable
as critical of-and thus as undermining the authority of-institutional staff.
Accordingly it is important for the parole board to know about the prisoner's
transfers, his time in segregation, his loss of good time-and how many days
have been lost-and so on.
Because of the stance of scepticism 38 adopted by board members when
considering central issues in the decision (such as original crime and prison
misconducts) in which a prisoner has a vested interest in presenting his
actions to the board in a particular light, tickets can be made to acquire a
very sinister meaning in some cases. Information elsewhere in the file or
sometimes passed orally to the board can transfigure the account presented
in the ticket. At a term fixing hearing in Jefferson, a young armed bank
robber was involved, according to the ticket, in a fight. A board member,
discussing the case before the prisoner entered, said, "He's supposed to be
disabled-but he was fighting with another guy and the guards think it was
a diversionary tactic while another guy tried the wall ....
It was planned at
least three weeks in advance."
Here a "fight" is transformed into a much more ominous misconduct,
for not only is the prisoner alleged to have been involved in aiding an escape
attempt, the incident is the more serious for having been planned in advance.
At his hearing, the prisoner, predictably, supported the account as presented
by the ticket, even displaying himself as partly to blame: "I'm small, and I
have a bit of a loud mouth. I guess I don't get on in an institutional setting
at all."
Bargainingand InstitutionalControl
Where board members encounter prison misconduct cases which they
would otherwise be prepared to parole, they are frequently confronted with
138. K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
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yet another dilemma. System pressures, which require a fairly stable and
predictable turnover in numbers to keep prison population levels under
control, may encourage or indeed compel them to be relatively tolerant in
their approach to the question of release. Perhaps as important, however, is
the fact that the board member's own sense of what constitutes a just
proportion of time for crime resists too much distortion of the crimepunishment equation in the interests of sanctioning institutional rule-breaking. Yet the interests of institutional control demand recognition of rulebreaking.
This dilemma is resolved by parole-board members resorting to bargaining. The prison troublemaker will often be told, "Keep your nose clean for
six months and you'll get out." Earlier release risks the appearance of
condoning the misconduct, yet where a prisoner may have been turned down
in the past, the board will be conscious of the fact that continued denial well
beyond the expected range of the prisoner's term risks the appearance of
vindictiveness-even though he may be branded an institutional troublemaker-quite apart from adding to the prison population burden. To bargain
with the inmate about his good behavior is a practical compromise to the
dilemma: The marginal cases are (eventually) paroled while the bad behavior
is marked and the capacity to deter is (presumably) retained.
The bargain is arranged either by giving the prisoner a parole release to
take effect some months in the future, conditional upon his good behavior,
or by denying him for a relatively short period on the understanding that a
display of compliance in the meantime (significantly described as a "demo"
in Madison argot) will be rewarded with a parole:
The third termer is up on a short pass. Myra Levin explains that he
is being seen because his conduct record, with a ticket for disobedience, is not good. Grant Jacobs adds that the board cannot parole
today because the prisoner has another ticket for soliciting sexual
favors from other inmates. "If we gave you another short pass,"
says Levin, "could you try to bring us clear conduct? No tickets?"
Jacobs adds, "What we're thinking about is an October date [it is
now July] providing there's no foolishness. Now cut that out. ...
We're talking about October, so don't screw it up. You already
screwed one of'em up."
Sometimes a prisoner is told explicitly that his institutional misconduct
is the sole reason for his being kept. In less serious cases the board finds it
irrational to parole where there is persistent institutional misconduct, as the
following dialogue (done partly rhetorically, for added force) between two
board members in the prisoner's presence suggests. (The 20 year old Madison
prisoner had already been flopped twice.)
Jack Collins:

Why so many misconduct reports?... So we were saying
we were ready to let you go if you could hold yourself
together. When was the last one?

Myra Levin:

Three months ago.
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Boy! We were trying, weren't we!
You could've gone in February and then in May. It means
the board is not terribly worried about your conduct, but
about your institutional behavior because it says something about the way you're likely to behave on the street.

Levin (to Collins):

How about nine?

Collins:

O.K.

Levin (to prisoner):
Correctional
Counselor:

Collins:

Can you go to February without getting any more tickets?
If the report is cool, you can go out in February.
But you also understand that if you blow up again that's
just the date you'll be looking at [referring to the maximum sentence].

I just been looking your file and you ain't got no criminal
record. You're being kept in this joint because you can't
make out in here.

[Prisoner leaves.]
Correctional
Counselor:

He's not a bad kid, but he just runs his mouth all the
time.

In this case, the overt rationale for refusing parole yet again is interesting
and familiar: The inmate's behavior says something about the way he is
likely to behave on the street. Even if the board members do not believe it
in any specific case, the justification does at least have the appearance of
rationality-and the prisoner might possibly believe it.
The degree to which a bargain will be honored is evident from the
following case where the board had second thoughts about a prisoner's
suitability:
A man on his fifth prison term had only two years left on his
sentence, having already served over eight. His record included three
robberies and two escapes; he was classified statistically as a "very
high" risk in terms of his propensity for further violence against the
person. The Madison board in Executive Session agreed not to parole
him. Then Cal Smith saw a note in the file that the board had
promised the man a parole if he kept his nose clean-and he had.
The board reluctantly reversed itself, agreeing to parole to keep its
word.
But where the bargain is broken the board will not hesitate to deny parole;
such is the degree of concern for not appearing to condone misconduct. In
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the following case (also from Madison) a 29-year-old fourth termer had
already been passed over three times for nine, four, and six months on the
grounds of his misconduct record in the institution. The board finally ordered
parole. Subsequently the inmate was found during a shakedown to have
twelve sticks of marijuana up his sleeve. He claimed he was holding it for
another inmate:
Jack Collins
(discussing the
first refusal):

Correctional
Counselor:
Collins:

At that time you had half a million tickets, didn't you!
Then you began to shape up. Or at least it looked that
way. You didn't get so many tickets, but then you blew
it and got more tickets. Are you 30? (Inmate says he will
soon be 30.) 30 years old. (Pauses.) Should I preach? I
don't normally preach. You're 30 years old and the
board's beginning to wonder whether you want to stick
around here, rather than go home. (Inmate protests his
innocence of the marijuana misconduct.)
Why was contraband up your sleeve if you were innocent?
Actually we've been trying to coax you out of prison, to
get you out, to shape up, to get you out of this joint....
Perhaps you like it in here too much?

[After further discussion of the inmate's attitude Collins decides to
refuse parole and tells the prisoner the case will have to go to
Executive Session to determine whether the pass should be six or
twelve months.]
Inmate
(angrily):

What's all this over? That one ticket!

Collins:

Yes. That one ticket. That says volumes.

In this case the one misconduct was apparently the sole criterion. Its force
may be judged from the fact that the prisoner was convicted of breaking
and entering-not normally regarded as "serious"-and he had already been
passed over on three prior occasions, apparently in recognition of his
unruliness since "B and E" men are not normally flopped more than once,
if at all. While the Madison board tended not to regard possession of
marijuana as a minor violation of disciplinary rules, it is also the case that
this charge was treated as substantially less serious than escape or tickets for
violence. But the prisoner was defined as persistent in his misconduct, and
39
persistence had to be sanctioned.a
Since the bargain is bound up with exemplary decision-making, the
prisoner must conspicuously be seen as having lived up to his side of it:
139. Those inmates who have particularly bad records of erratic behavior inside ("the
unstable") can also be handled in the same way. They may be required for their "demo" to
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The prisoner had been involved in a sawn-off shotgun robbery of a
store. He had been passed over for nine months at his first hearing,
subsequently receiving a number of tickets and the loss of seven
months' good time. The inmate claimed he had been harassed by
another prisoner and by officers "writing him up" [giving him
tickets]. The board member read out a list of infractions from the
file, concluding with ". . . but since February you've been clear."
"I'm looking you right in the eye as I say this," Carl Mayer
continued, "cause I'm going to go back on my word. I saw you last
time and I remember it very well. But you've not lived up to your
side of the bargain. For me it's going to be a flop. Program-wise
you're doing some good things but the tickets reflect an attitude you
gotta put right before you get outa here. How can a guy get such
good program reports and such crappy disciplinary write-ups?"
Mayer suggested a nine-month pass. His colleague, Dan Johnson,
was slightly more favorably disposed and suggested six months.
Mayer agreed with reluctance, telling the prisoner, "And I'm biting
my tongue on it, I want you to know." In the notes written at the
end of the hearing the board members said they wanted a "clear
conduct record as assurance." As the inmate prepared to leave
Johnson said, "You were expecting a year, right?" The prisoner
smiled and agreed. The institution had recommended a twelve-month
flop, but he had a date in six months if he behaved himself. [A
Madison case.]
Inmates therefore have to play the game to get out by doing in prison what
parole boards define as appropriate for their "problems" or "needs."
Bargaining is facilitated in those jurisdictions where there is personal
contact between prisoner and parole board and the board gives reasons in
person to the prisoner as to why he has not been released. In these
circumstances the board is able to announce to the inmate what he must do
in the future to achieve a favorable verdict. Indeed, a system of personal
hearings (commonplace in the U.S.) greatly facilitates bargaining between
board and prisoner; presumably the sanctioning force of a denial is weakened
where there is no personal contact between parole board and prisoner, as in
the present English parole system. 14 It is in the interest of those American
parole boards which give reasons to prisoners in person for a refusal
immediately after the hearing to spell out what the prisoner must do to
secure a favorable verdict in the future. If he conforms, and does what is
continue their term successfully in open population in the institution. This also offers the board
a means of rationally releasing the prisoner who has proved difficult but who has certainly
served his time on other grounds.
140. One of the criticisms made about the English parole system, where there is no personal
hearing nor any reasons given for a parole refusal, is that the system denies the possibility of
implicit bargaining. The prisoner who is not told why he has been turned down cannot know
what he has to do to receive more favorable treatment the next time his case is considered. K.
Hawkins, Parole Procedure: An Alternative Approach, 13 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 6 (1973).
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required, the board has been presented with grounds (which it has already
defined as suitable) for release. In other words, a subsequent release appears
to be rational. A failure to abide by the rules is open to interpretation as a
reason for not being paroled by inmates and staff using common sense
conceptions about punishment and reward in conjunction with the common
stock of knowledge in prison about board practice.' 14 In a bureaucratic,
depersonalized system like the English, however, the interpretive work in
which staff and inmates must engage is altogether more precarious, though
no less inevitable.
Where board members have personal contact with prisoners, they frequently exploit their position of authority in support of institutional rules:
"You know enough to do what the guard says. You know you can't win.
Just go ahead and move when the man tells you to move."
In cases where prison misconduct has been a central issue, hearings
frequently close with a blunt exhortation, pitched in terms which inmates
most readily grasp: "Quit bein' stupid. You ain't no big-time hoodlum. Stay
cool." The frequent use of such forms of exhortation suggests that prison
conduct is very largely viewed as a matter within the prisoner's choice and
control, rather than as evidence of pathology:
Myra Levin
(having agreed
to parole):

Can you try to bring us good conduct if we do that? If
there are tickets you'll max out.

Inmate:

I wasn't expecting that, but I'll do that much for you.

Levin and
Collins (together as a
chorus):

It's not for us, it's for you.

Jack Collins:

I've heard a lot of guys over the years say, "Man, do I
want out." But they don't act like it. You learn that there
are other things more important like saving face, peer
pressure, and the rest. Those are the things that are more
important to them than getting out. [A Madison case.]

In prisons where inmate unruliness is a major problem, board members
may often present a very clear inducement to a prisoner: they offer him a
release-but not an immediate release-and in return he "keeps his nose
clean." One Hamilton case observed in 1968, for example, involved a man
convicted of a violent crime who had a long record of misconduct in prison.
There had been no reports of trouble, however, since his last hearing. It was
made clear to the inmate by the board that his misconduct was the only
reason why he had not been released earlier. The chairman of the board
congratulated the prisoner on his better conduct and on two separate
141. P. Morris & F. Beverly, Myths and Expectations: Anticipations of the Parole
Experience, I ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 153 (1972).
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occasions within the space of a few minutes told him that the board was
quite willing to be "conned" so long as he avoided collecting disciplinary
reports. This, the chairman explained to the prisoner, would give the parole
board good reason to make a favorable decision. In the discussion following
the departure of the prisoner, the chairman remarked that the inmate had
kept his nose clean for a year. "He may be conning us about his good
behavior", said a colleague. "But at least he's succeeding", was the reply.
The board decided to grant parole. The chairman told the institutional parole
staff that the prisoner should be informed that any subsequent misconduct
would be treated very seriously indeed. Furthermore, a note should be sent
to the inmate informing him that the board wanted 42"exemplary conduct"
from him for his remaining period of imprisonment.
This kind of compromise is another means of displaying the decision to
the prison population as rational.
Carl Mayer was concerned with the prisoner's tickets when discussing
a case in an Executive Session of the Madison board. "To outweigh
the tickets, has there at least been some programming?" he asked.
"Has he done a trade?" On hearing a colleague respond by reading
details of the four tickets to him, Mayer concluded ruefully, "Gee.
Sure doesn't give you much to hang that [parole] on."
Without a conspicuous show of approved behavior as the prisoner's contribution to the bargain board members will be anxious about appearing to
condone misconduct in the eyes of the inmates and staff and thereby to risk
an attenuation of the deterrent authority of a parole board denial. The
interests of control require again that some minimal sign of good conduct
be offered by the prisoner. The appearance of good behavior will help erase
less favorable features in the prisoner's case, as the following example from
Madison of a third termer who had already been refused a year earlier
suggests. He had an escape in his record. The discussion turned to the man's
institutional misconducts:
Inmate:

I can't live down my past.

Carl Mayer:

Yes you can. The only way is to stay cool, man.

[The board decides on another twelve month flop.]
Inmate:

I was looking to be released today.

Carl Mayer:

You can go this year and stay clean and we'll see what
we can do ....

We don't care where you do it, just stay

clean. If you don't come out clean, you're gonna max
out.

The board member here is not concerned in the slightest with the rehabili-

142. This case is taken from K. Hawkins, Some Consequences of a Parole System for
FUTURE OF PAROLE 96 (1972).
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tation program, just that the prisoner "stay clean." Bargaining about
institutional conduct is apt, then, because it is conduct which is generally
recognised as that part of the prisoner's institutional performance which is
most within his control. In Madison and Hamilton the bargain will be quite
explicitly understood as such, while the same is true of the term-fixing
hearings in Jefferson.
Craig Friedman
(discussing the
case before the
hearing):

Mark Sutton:

I'd say about 30 to 33 months then offer some sort of
acceleration if he goes into some drug program up to a
year. What do you think?
O.K.

Friedman (subsequently giving the
decision to the
inmate):
We also said six months [with] no problems in the institution, we'd parole you to an inpatient drug program.
(My emphasis.)
The giving of reasons to prisoners in person is a relatively recent practice
in many American parole systems, having been introduced in the last ten or
fifteen years as a concession to the movement towards more due process and
greater administrative accountability. The uncertainty which existed where
reasons for action were not made clear, as in the traditional indeterminate
sentencing and parole systems, provoked considerable criticism from commentators. In the most familiar criticism of the indeterminate sentence there
was uncertainty, it was claimed, as to the amount of time a prisoner would
have to serve.' 43 But there was also uncertainty as to the criteria which had
been-and would be-treated as significant by the decision-makers. Both
kinds of uncertainty were condemned as the source of poor inmate morale.
For institutional administrators, with their concern for efficient management, the morale of both inmates and staff is a constant preoccupation. The
power to manipulate terms served is regarded as having profound consequences for the atmosphere within a prison. Yet the uncertainty inherent in
parole-board practices gives prison managers a much less sanguine view of
these effects of administrative discretion, and one which has proved to be
more persuasive to policy-makers in recent years. In traditional parole
systems the positivist rationale exploited the coercive force of uncertainty.
Inmates will do what they can to get out, it was assumed, and uncertainty
as to precisely how long they will have to serve concentrates their minds on
good behavior and self-improvement. As an administrator of a traditional
parole and indeterminate sentencing system (in Western State) once remarked,
143. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE

COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

FOGEL, "WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF": THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS

(1975).
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with a comment which could be taken as a prototypical statement of positivist
ideology:'"
With this system, you don't fix the time [in advance]. You keep [the
prisoner] agitated. You keep him nervous. You keep him worried.
You keep him wondering what's wrong with him. You keep working
on this [for him] to get some insight. Then, when he comes up
before the board, why, he's been working on his problems and he's
better equipped to do something about them when he goes out.
The logic supporting the long maximum terms and the high administrative
discretion of the traditional parole system is here very persuasive, provided
the dubious assumption about prisoners' responses to uncertainty is accepted.
The problem of uncertainty is exacerbated when staff do not understand the
parole board's decisions because they, too, are unclear as to what to do to
prepare the prisoner for more favorable consideration in the future.
Criticisms of uncertainty about the criteria, rationale or timing of
decisions claim that when a prisoner does not know what the board based
its refusal on in his case he will not know what to do to improve his chances
next time. Perhaps the problem is more subtle than that, however. Prisoners
know very well the rules of the game that they and parole boards play. They
know what the board is looking for. It wants, in the language of the prison,
"To see you walk that walk and hear you talk that talk." The real source
of uncertainty arises from the fact that the prisoner does not know how the
cues he presents next time will be interpreted. A man who 'keeps his nose
clean' cannot rely on getting out unless the board has specifically bargained
with him to this effect. And even then it is a chancy matter (unless there is
a written record of the bargain) for if a subsequent panel, comprised of
different members, evaluates him less favorably (for whatever reason) the
prisoner will be typified as 'knowing how to do time' (grounds for suspicion
reducing the likelihood of release), rather than as 'having made a good
adjustment.'
In parole systems where many prisoners may expect to see the board on
more than one occasion, inmates may become the victims of competing
definitions of central concepts like "crime," "problem," or "need" employed by board members, quite apart from potentially conflicting assessments of whether they have "genuinely" been motivated to participate,
whether they have given a "sincere" account, or whether their self-portrait
is "trustworthy." The problem is one of consistency, both in terms of how
the same case is dealt with over time by different decision-makers, and how
potentially similar cases are dealt with at the same time by different decisionmakers. Both effects are visible to inmates, particularly the former. Competing definitions of salient features arise where the prisoner is judged by
different board members, as usually happens where boards split into smaller
panels to conduct routine hearings. A prisoner will normally find himself

144. K. Hawkins, supra note 68.
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seen subsequently by a panel consisting of different board members. And
even if he is confronted by the same board member who interviewed him on
an earlier occasion, it is by no means the case that that member will play
much of a part in the subsequent decision, especially in systems where turn45
taking practices in interviewing and proposing a decision operate.1
The compromise of bargaining is a further facet of the parole board's
preoccupation with rationality. Where the parole of a persistently and
continuously troublesome prisoner would appear to staff and inmates alike
to be irrational, the unruly inmate who spends time in general population
and succeeds in keeping himself free from tickets displays himself to the
prison community not only as compliant but thereby as improved, this visible
evidence of change for the better making a decision to release seem reasonable.
A concern for appearances, however, poses problems when the board is
confronted with a prisoner who persists in his misconduct, but the board
needs to maintain population turnover. As one member said in such a case,
"... it's kinda hard for us when you keep having infractions." A concern
for appearance as much as substance reveals the game-like quality of much
of the bargaining which goes on. For example, in the following case the
inmate wanted to be quite sure he knew the rules the board would play by:
The prisoner had been seen twice already and had collected six
disciplinaries in the meantime. The decision hinged entirely on his
prison conduct, Jorge Martinez, the board chairman, concluding
"He's dumb. He makes no attempt to play along with the system.
If we give him a long date on the understanding that if there are
any misconducts we'll take away his parole?" Subsequently the
chairman announced the decision to the prisoner:
Martinez:

The decision is to give you an extended parole on March
1, 1980 [i.e. six months later], but it's contingent upon
you getting no misconducts ....
If you really mean you
don't intend getting any more misconducts you have a
parole in your pocket.

Inmate:

But I never came in here with the intention of getting
misconducts.

Martinez:

I know. But you've been in here four years and you
ought to be able to see the situation coming ....

Inmate:

O.K. What are you talking about? One misconduct or-?

Martinez:

We'll hear about them and we'll evaluate them. Make a
special effort. O.K.? Good luck. [A Hamilton case.]

145. Id.
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This system of bargaining has operated in an informal way for years. In
a penal system ostensibly committed to rehabilitation, the very foundations
of institutional treatment programs rest on the parole board's ultimate
authority to coerce inmates to take part in them by the prospect of early
release. Prisoners, as always, also know the rules of this game. They know
that board members are looking for evidence of a commitment to prison
programs %ihich is explicit, visible, and "genuine." So far as prisoners are
concerned, their motive for engaging in treatment programs may simply be
a desire to provide the parole board with the evidence of commitment it is
looking for, allied with a wish to relieve the tedium of months or years of
incarceration. For their part, parole board members approach the task of
evaluating a prisoner's commitment and accomplishment with a degree of
suspicion that may stem partly from an awareness that prisoners know how
to play the game. Perhaps more important as a source of suspicion, however,
is the fact that the motives and accounts of the morally disreputable are
suspect. They are much more likely to be explicitly regarded as adopting the
ploy of presenting the board with the kinds of evidence it is looking for.
They are seen in this way because the board will be looking for evidence to
confirm the model it has already established of the prisoner's moral disreputability, which has been created by his crime and record. The more morally
disreputable the prisoner, the more likely he is to be deemed able to con the
board, or the more likely he is to be defined as dangerous, because his
motives are suspect. Where the prisoner is regarded as less morally disreputable, his motives for engaging in prison programs will not be enquired into.
Parole Boards and the Administration of the Penal System
While the power to control time served in individual cases confers a
substantial authority over prisoners, seen in the aggregate the general power
to affect terms served by all prisoners eligible for parole (that is, the great
majority of state and federal prisoners) grants another kind of control to
parole boards that derives from their position in the network of relationships
with other agencies in the penal system. Parole boards enjoy, in effect, a
substantial authority to affect the administration of other parts of the penal
system with their control of prison population levels and the allocation of
punishment.
Maintenance of population equilibrium is to be observed wherever people
are processed by officials possessing wide discretion. For example, though
the police'"
could readily multiply the number of arrests for some petty offenses,
they somehow manage to produce just the right number to keep the
courts busy and the jails full. With the same uncanny instinct they
burden the hospital just to the limit of its capacity.

146. E. Bittner, supra note 87, at 280-281.
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Parole boards stand close to the center of a network of relationships with
other agencies which all have an interest in the punishment of offenders. In
practical terms this means that these agencies are also concerned with the
amount of time being served by prisoners. They are in a position to help
maintain the equilibrium of the loose federation of different institutions and
agencies which comprise the criminal-justice system by controlling prison
input and output rates, and, hence, prison population levels. 47 This in turn
has major implications for the costs of the penal system.
The control of prison population levels is a matter of abiding concern
in penal systems. Excess population levels occur from time to time posing
considerable problems for penal administrators. During fieldwork, all three
states (in common with most other state prison systems) were suffering
acutely from a crisis of overcrowding. Parole boards are well placed to
alleviate such problems, of course, in a particularly smooth and discreet
fashion. Indeed, historically the emergence and early administration of parole
was tied closely with the desire to ameliorate the difficulties of crowded
institutions.' 48 In California, write Berk et al., "starting in 1907, regulation
aimed at gearing the growth of the prison population to available and
expected resources became a fundamental, if somewhat fumbling, part of
the incarceration process .... [T]his was probably true outside of California
as well.' ' 49 In England the prisons have for several years been burdened
with a plethora of inmates and it is interesting that the capacity of the parole
system has recently been extended to render more prisoners eligible for
consideration, in an effort to bring prison population
levels (generally
50
regarded as at crisis point) under greater control.
The problem of overcrowding in the prisons is a significant item in
parole decision making in at least three senses. First, it serves as a context
in which decisions in individual cases are made. Overcrowding in this sense
is a matter impinging on the tolerances which operate in any particular
decision. In the words of a senior prison official:
The law of supply and demand certainly operates here. If we've got
an overcrowded situation, the board looking at us would say, "We've
got to do everything possible to extend co-operation to alleviate the
overcrowding situation."
Secondly, overcrowding may be an issue prompting the adapting of general
parole policy, as a member of the Madison board suggested:
We've pulled certain types of cases and we've gone through as many
as 1500 cases at one time. Certain types of cases, first offenders, no

147. See R. Berk, S. Messinger, D. Rauma, & J. Berecochea, Prisons as Self-Regulating

Systems: A Comparison of HistoricalPatternsin Californiafor Male and Female Offenders,
17 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 547 (1983).
148. K. Hawkins, supra note 68.
149. R. Berk, et al., supra note 147, at 580 (emphasis in original).
150. Hom OsmcE, REVEW OF PAROE ni ENGLAND ANfD WALES (1981);
BOARD FOR ENGLAND AND WALES FOR 1984 (1985).
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juvenile history, no prior history, non-assaultive offenses, [pre-

dicted risk] low and low, and this kind of business. And we screened
them for ...

special paroles, we made special arrangements with

the courts on it. We've done several things on our own, and we've
talked with the Director [of Corrections] about ... moving people
to Correction Centers more quickly ....
We are conscious of the

problem and we do something about it when we can, on our own.
Thirdly, overcrowding may sometimes be employed (as bad behavior by a
particular prisoner is) as a criterion in an individual case decision. Another
member of the Madison board had this to say:
Hawkins:

Are you conscious of [overcrowding], however vaguely,
shaping the way you do your work...?

Mayer:

Yeah. I do. I am. There's no question about it. You get
the B and E [breaking and entering] guy, the first offender
with a two to something or other. He hasn't been in
school .

..

y'know he's just been doing his time. You

say, "Well, I'll take a chance on this guy," you know.
And if he doesn't look too bad and not too many tickets,
and the adjectives are not that extreme ...
The core of these processes is "a concern for maintaining resources
sufficient to establish or continue the uneasy peace that is usually found
inside prison walls".15 1 Members of parole boards are well aware of the
pressures on the prisons and the management difficulties which prison staff
have to endure when institutions are crammed full. In the words of yet
another of the Madison board: "I know living conditions for the inmates,
the possibility of riot for the staff, the not-being-able-to-do-your-job that
overcrowding causes." Overcrowding is both a matter of public concern in
most states, as well as a matter of considerable significance for correctional
budgeting and planning. At the same time it is also, of course, a matter of
personal significance for individual inmates. It affects the quality of life
behind bars. Crowded institutions are widely regarded as even more unpleasant places to live in; and there are implications also for the security conditions
under which prisoners are held, and their privileges, such as the number of
visits they are allowed, when the available staff resources are spread more
thinly. In some cases prisoners will find themselves being transferred to less
congenial locations, and they often discover that this also results in elimination of their opportunities to win parole by engaging in programs to
display themselves to parole boards as "improved." In Madison and Hamilton, for example, the county jails were being forced during the research
fieldwork to hold some of the surplus population from the state prisons.
One Madison prisoner who had "problems" was denied at an Executive
Session ostensibly because she had not participated in any programs. But the

151. R. Berk, el a., supra note 147, at 580.
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board recognized that the woman had no choice in the matter, having been
transferred to the county jail because of overcrowding, one member commenting, "This is a sad case; it shows what overcrowding can do." To this
the chairman added, "Certainly needs a lot of help, and she's not getting it
in jail."
It is as a problem of organizational management, however, that overcrowding is regarded with greatest concern. It is a widely-held belief in the
prisons, and one which parole-board members are well aware of, that an
overcrowded institution causes problems of control. 5 2 A parole board responsive to these concerns, therefore, may seek to effect an easing of the
management difficulties: It is, after all, in a suitable position to achieve
some reduction in the average length of term served. Even a slight reduction
can have substantial impact upon population levels. The trimming can be
made flexibly and virtually invisibly. Furthermore, the board also possesses
some control over input to the prisons with its decisions about parole
revocation. As a member of the Jefferson board said, "There's a good 20
per cent of people [parole violators], I've reinstated on parole because of
the current overcrowding." The precision of this figure is not as important
as the fact that the remark suggests that the board member was sufficiently
conscious of population pressure for it to have been employed by him as the
crucial criterion in a proportion of cases. The same concerns reach down to
those who work in the lower reaches of the organization to become a
determinant of the screening decisions made by parole officers about whether
to recall parole violators to prison. Emerson'13 quotes one officer as saying:
"In the long run, you can't have too many or too few returns. You usually
don't have to worry about having too few because there's a natural recidivism
built into your caseload. Usually you have to worry about too many returns.
Sometimes you have to take it easy. You have to ignore things you don't
really want to ignore."
Institutional staff believe that overcrowding makes their job more difficult: "We've had problems with large numbers [for the last five years],"
said a prison warden in Madison.
I've never liked it because of all the pressure it puts on all your
facilities, the anxieties it produces for prisoners and for staff. It's
not a healthy environment in which to have prisoners and staff all
the time. But then in terms of having any major-major-problem
as a result, we've not had them. [His emphasis.]

152. One example (according to preliminary analysis of the problem) of the trouble which
institutional officials seek to avoid occurred in February, 1980, when the population level at
the New Mexico State penitentiary reached a critical point and erupted in violence in which
more than thirty prisoners died. In a study of the effects of overcrowding, the authors concluded
that "the sheer population size of an institution exerts a negative influence on its inmates": G.
MCCAIN,

V. COX, & P. PAULUS,

THE EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR vii

(1980). A further finding was "a progressive and measurable increase in negative effects with
an increase in housing density." Id. at iv.
153. R. Emerson, supra note 91, at 441.
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The staff in institutions accordingly have a substantial incentive to see that
the discretion of parole-board members is exercised in particular ways which
help manage the population levels in institutions while not threatening their
control of inmate conduct. One of the doubtless apocryphal stories of paroleboard behavior which used to be current in a mid-western state was that it
did not pay to see the board on a Monday. Friday was much to be preferred
because by then the board members would have calculated their release rate
for the week, discovered they had been too intolerant, and would compensate
15 4
at the end of the week by releasing marginal cases more readily.
Board members find that their attention will be drawn by institutional
staff to population pressures as a matter of routine:
You get it [pressure to help reduce overcrowding] every time you get
in the Warden's office. He'll say "Jesus Christ, give me some help."
And you've got to be responsive. You might be able to relax a little,
a month or two. But sometimes you just can't.
These remarks were made about the position in Madison. But it was the
same in Jefferson. One set of hearings began with the associate superintendent of an institution putting his head round the door to greet the board
members with the remark, "We got more in here than we got space for."
At another institution in the same state, explicit and continuous pressure was
exerted upon the parole panel by the institutional counsellor who was sitting
with the board. For example, when asked his opinion of a particular
prisoner's prospects, he said, with deadly seriousness: "So far as I'm
concerned he's ready to go. We need the cell space." It was probably this
comment that provoked the board members to 'tease the counsellor about
the haste with which he was trying to push matters through to favorable
conclusions during the case which followed. It prompted a board member to
comment: "You sell roller skates, don't you?" To which the counsellor
replied: "I need the cell space." Hamilton, also, was no exception to the
pattern of overcrowding observable in the summer and fall of 1979, when
fieldwork took place. In that state, for example, the position was described
tersely by the chairman of the parole board as, "Past capacity. The worst
it's been." The Guards Association in Hamilton had also formally complained to the Commissioner of Correction about overcrowding and understaffing.
The parole board should not, however, be regarded as a valve that
merely opens more readily when extra pressure is exerted upon it. Valves are
designed to retain contents which are not under pressure, and there is some
evidence that parole boards behave the same way by keeping population
levels up to a certain point at times when institutions have empty cells. It is
in the interest of efficient management to have population levels that rest in

154. This is an illustration of the way a stream of cases over time may be treated with
different tolerances depending on resource availabilities. See the discussion of such caseload
effects in Emerson, id.
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an equilibrium below maximum capacity, but not in the personal interest of
staff for population levels to be so low that they are transferred away to
other, less congenial institutions, or that it becomes difficult to run the
prison efficiently. After all, prisoners "represent the critical bodies needed
for food processing, to fill classrooms, vocational shops, and the industries
such as shoemaking, textiles, food preserving, dairying, road construction,
and forest conservation. An implicit system requirement is to maintain
population equilibrium.""' In other words, the interests of systems management take precedence over the interests of personal liberty as well as over
the interests of punishment. In Jefferson in the late 1960s, for example, the
chairman of the board received complaints from the state's Department of
Natural Resources that some prisoners based in conservation camps who
carried out forestry work in conjunction with the Department were being
paroled too soon. It was not a question of the men being regarded as
unsuitable for release, but a reflection of the fact that their departure reduced
the skilled labor pool, thereby depriving the Department of the investment
it had put into the forestry training it had given to the prisoners. Indeed
another of the apocryphal stories about parole boards which used to be
current in the prisons in a mid-western state drew attention to the need
boards have to maintain certain levels of population. Inmates used to argue
that the first baseman of the prison baseball team (or the chef, in some
versions) should not expect parole during the season (presumably the chef
should not expect parole at all).
Whether or not there remains a means of discretionary early release in
the form of traditional parole, questions about managing the penal system
will have to be resolved in practice, for its priorities transcend the particular
penal philosophy ostensibly in operation. "Guards and foremen who are to
use work crews efficiently and to maintain peaceful routines, as well as treat
inmates," wrote Cressey, "cannot accept a system of discharges, job transfers, and other treatment activities that ignores the institutional necessities
and operates solely on the basis of individual needs of inmates.' ' 56 Though
these remarks were made twenty-five years ago when rehabilitative penology
was at its height, they are also likely to be true of a penal system founded
upon individualized punishment, simply because the temptation to try to
solve immediate organizational problems by the use of administrative discretion is so great. If the administrative discretion of the parole board is
removed or substantially cut down and parole boards abolished or severely
constrained by guidelines, the pressures upon the system will force an
adaptation elsewhere in the handling system, perhaps with the behavior of
prosecutors or judges, as appears to have been the case in California, since
7
the adoption there of a system of presumptive sentencing. '

155. Takagi, supra note 84, at 81.
156. D. CRESEY (ed.), THE PRISON:
101 (1961).
157. K. Hawkins, supra note 40.
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The adaptive capacities of the traditional parole system provided by the
flexibility of administrative discretion draw attention to the reciprocal relationships which exist between the various segments of the criminal justice
system. The decision practices of parole boards almost certainly reach back
in some-as yet generally unexplored158-way to influence the behavior of
other officials who possess discretionary authority over offenders. For example, since the traditional parole board (that is, the board with at least a
moderate degree of discretionary latitude) plays the major part in the
punishing of serious offenders by determining how long they actually have
to serve, it is likely that board term-fixing practices create a series of general
expectations among prosecutors and judges which in turn will affect their
charging and sentencing behavior. At the same time this discretionary
authority can be employed to serve the interests of other segments of the
criminal process. For example, I happened to be present in the chairman's
office in Eastern State when he was telephoned by a district attorney with a
request for an early parole for a prisoner due up before the board in one of
the state prisons in three weeks time. The man was part of an organized
crime group and had offered to name three accomplices in return for parole.
The district attorney wanted the board's cooperation.
It is the prosecutor's discretion over negotiations as to charge and plea
which makes her or him such a powerful official in so many state systems
of criminal justice. But where the judge possesses a wide sentencing discretion
(in sentencing structures such as the English), he or she also becomes a key
figure in the reciprocal relationships in the system. In England parole is
often officially justified on the grounds that it has helped contribute to some
control being exerted over a burgeoning prison population. This argument is
true only to the extent that judicial sentencing behavior is largely constant
and unaffected by the relatively recent grafting onto the penal system of an
institution explicitly designed selectively to make inroads upon the principle
of commensurability as expressed in the judicially fixed sentence. It is possible
to argue to the contrary, however, namely that parole may have actually
added to prison overcrowding, if its introduction has prompted the judges
to lengthen their sentencing tariffs even slightly to ensure that prisoners do
a certain minimum of time.5 9 Only a minor shift in judicial sentencing

158. Some of the possibilities here were canvassed in a classic paper, L. Ohlin & F.
Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 495 (1958), but this lead never seems to have been pursued
explicitly by researchers.
159. This is speculation. A small study by Walker found no effects on sentence length,
though it should be noted that his study was conducted on data from the scheme's first two
years of operation, when it worked on a very small scale. See N. Walker, A Note on Parole
and Sentence Lengths, CRIM. L. REV. 821 (1981). It is an accepted principle of sentencing in
English law that courts may allow for the granting of remission for good behavior and lengthen
their sentences accordingly when treatment or incapacitation are the aims. R. v. Turner, Cr.
App. Rep. 72 (1967). The position is also difficult to research in England owing to the existence
of other factors which have almost certainly contributed to an increase in terms, such as the
abolition of capital punishment and the perceived growth in violent crime.
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behavior over a period of time would be necessary to produce a noticeable
effect on prison population levels.,6o
Conclusion
The last section of the paper has tried to show that the use of discretion
by legal officials has an important administrative aspect. The sanctioning
practices engaged in by parole boards in response to institutional misconduct
mirror their sanctioning of the prisoner's crime and record.' 6, In both, the
board's concern seems to be directed backwards to an assessment of a just
punishment for what a deviant has done, rather than directed to the future
in a prediction of what he is likely to do. The latter, of course, is a rationale
of peculiar appropriateness as a means of justifying action taken on other
grounds, just as it is in judging crime and the propensity for further wrongdoing. More importantly, however, the sanctioning practices are both intimately concerned with the management of appearances. While there is a
visible audience of one (the prisoner) for the symbolic decisions made about
prison conduct, there are other audiences, unseen and unheard, behind the.
scenes in the depths of the prison. A theme of this analysis has been a parole
board's concern for the appearance of rationality so far as its interested
audiences are concerned. Thus a bargain struck will be honored even if a
prisoner is subsequently deemed on other criteria to be unsuitable, because
a bargain derives its worth for its general audience from its binding force in
a specific case. And since a parole board's organizational concern for what
is rational is directed towards support of an institutional code centered upon
the necessity for control, a major consequence is that parole board decisions
often have little to do with judgments about "rehabilitation," or "risk," or
other aspects of a prisoner'sfuture conduct. The behavior of parole boards
in this sense is tantamount to responding to the form of conduct, rather
than its content.
What is important for parole boards, for practical purposes, is that they
engage in predictable behavior. Accordingly, they organize their decisions to
reflect a coherent and comprehensible approach to the problem of institutional control. A system of disciplinary punishments and rewards is patterned
to be readily recognizable, while parole boards at the same time struggle
with their own peculiar problem of administrative control, that of maintaining a steady turnover of prison population. Predictable behavior allows its

160. There is much historical evidence of the relationship between the use of the paroling
authority and the numbers of those incarcerated. Indeed many jurisdictions in the early twentieth
century were accused of too liberal a use of the parole power as a means of controlling their
population levels. The relationship was also recognized in England when the proposal to
introduce a parole system was first made; a Government White Paper, The Adult Offender,
noted, perhaps disingenuously, as grounds supporting the introduction of parole, that it would
incidentally go some way to alleviate the existing overcrowding in the prisons. Home Office,
The Adult Offender, para. 8 (1965).
161. See K. Hawkins, supra note 5.
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organizational audience the opportunity of making its own decisions in
anticipation of the parole board's response.
Predictability is also encouraged by a commitment by parole boards to
the values of consistency-the principle that like offenders are treated alike.
This is a principle which staff and inmates understand; indeed, it is deeply
ingrained in the fabric of life in institutions. "Inmates demanded," McCleary
writes, "and officials asserted as a premise of prison life that all inmates
must be treated equally. ' 162 Predictability is also a major concern in the
internal management of parole board decision-making. Any individual or
group which must routinely make decisions finds it important to anchor
verdicts in a precedent or series of similar judgments which together add up
to a tradition of decisions, however recent or flimsy that tradition may be.
Reference to precedent not only helps advance the sense of the rational and
reduce the anxieties created by a particular case, it also quells the possibility
of a contentious decision among those passing judgment.
When sanctioning institutional misconduct, a parole board's visible
behavior resembles the stipulations of a rehabilitative ideology. This is to be
seen in the implicit, and often explicit, bargaining which goes on between
board and prisoner. In both, a parole release is the great prize offered by
the board. In both, the prisoner offers the correction of some part of his
conduct or character which is regarded as within his control. Where a board
defers or denies parole, this is usually with the implied suggestion that the
prisoner needs to take some particular action to achieve a favorable verdict
next time. In rehabilitative theory this would be conspicuous effort at some
form of self-improvement, in the realm of prison conduct some visibly better
behavior. And even where matters are not now within the prisoner's control
(such as, the gravity of his crime or the length of his record), population
pressures compel the implied bargain to be still recognized: "In the absence
of any good reason to keep you in, do your time, keep your nose clean, and
you get out." This use of bargaining is aligned with another dominant
conception surrounding parole, one possible only in a system of discretionary
selective release, that it is a benefit to be earned, granted by the grace of a
63
benevolent state.1
The dominance of the organizational frame, expressed in the desire to
sanction inmate misconduct is a pervasive thing, cutting across the particular
ideological preferences of individual decision-makers. To sanction misbehavior serves a number of often very different purposes, and it is this which
makes such use of the discretion to parole such a persistent feature in the
behavior of traditional parole boards:
... we're saying to [the prisoner]: "You've got to be
more concerned than you have been so far." And I'm

162. R. McCleery, Communication Patterns as Bases of Systems of Authority and Power,
in R. Cloward, et al., supra note 117, at 56.
163. M. Gottesman & L. Hecker, Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations and
Conditions, 38 N.Y. U. L. REV. 702 (1963).
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also hoping that.., there'll be a learning experience....
Not that they're going to learn to solve all the problems,
but they're going to learn that there are some consequences. [A Madison board member.]
These remarks suggest an admixture of symbolic and positivist elements. The
idea of a parole denial as the communication of a message to the prisoner
is allied with another which suggests that the sanction can effect a change in
behavior for the better. Indeed, the coincidence of interests is such that most
parole board members seem implicitly to treat a failure to engage in treatment
programs as itself a species of institutional misconduct, especially where they
are committed to a view of the prisoner as a flawed individual in need of
repair. It is a short step from this position to one which regards treatment
programs as a means of institutional control (quite apart from any therapeutic
value they may possess):
I think if you took away the program, or the positive things that we
try to give them, oh, Jeez, then I hate to think what would
happen.... I think if they ever stop this in the prison and just
reached the point of saying, "You're going to prison for punishment,
we're gonna lock your butt up," and that's it-then you really got
trouble. [A Madison board member.]
But this is not to suggest that the interests of prison management are pursued
unquestioningly by parole boards, for apart from cases where their own
sense of values as to what constitutes commensurate punishment may collide
with institutional concerns, there may be cases in which the board's own
priorities will take precedence, especially where the board adheres with a
high degree of commitment to a competing ideology. In the sixties that
official idealogy was rehabilitation. The basic tasks of institutional officials
are holding and controlling a body of inmates, and while parole boards
acknowledge and usually seek to support them, they must also recognize that
their basic task is continually to release, for whatever purposes, a selected
part of the inmate body:
The Jefferson board [which in 1968 was comprised of individuals
heavily committed to the goal of rehabilitation] had already decided
to parole a prisoner, when he was caught in an act of homosexuality
in the prison. The board decided nevertheless to go ahead with the
parole, which prompted the prison warden to complain to the board,
since he had recommended a year's denial as a sanction. The Board
had added only a month, which provoked the remark from the
warden that this was insufficient for "such a serious infraction"
because "it looks as if the administration and the Board are condoning active homosexual involvement in the institution." The board
chairman, however, thought that the prisoner had had quite enough
punishment meted out "by the previous institution action of being
sentenced to twenty (20) days isolation, loss of custody from minimum custody to close custody, loss of his job, indefinite segregation,

1242

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1161

and further that he has a detainer [warrant] and will face prosecution
in Federal Court immediately upon his release."'1'
Such cases are not, however, commonly found.
IV.

A REFLECTION

In general, parole discretion is exercised in part to assist the institutions
of criminal punishment by sanctioning breaches of their rules. The shape
discretion takes reflects the fact that legal punishment is administered by
organizations, and whenever organizations are involved, questions connected
with management and efficiency assume considerable significance. In consequence, a substantial part of parole board discretion is exercised to an
extent independent of ostensibly rationalist concerns about punishment for
crime in the community, the risk of offenders to the public, or the reintegration of the offender into the community.
The organizational frame generates meaning and relevance of a particular
kind for the decision-maker: It imposes a structure upon information, gives
meaning to it and translates a relevant item of information into a decision
criterion. This is not to argue that all parole decisions are made within this
frame (they are not), or even dominated by organizational concerns, but
rather to suggest that in certain kinds of cases, in certain kinds of contexts,
and at certain times (for frames may become more or less prominent over
time), organizational values provide a significant context which shapes the
making of a decision. Thus one of the major characteristics of decision
behavior framed by organizational interests is that it is molded by a concern
for the projected implications of a decision with a particular outcome. The
decision is made in anticipation of the responses of significant audiences. In
the case of parole decision-making this means that although the attention of
the board member may be directed towards the future, it is predictive in
ways not necessarily anticipated by a rationalist conception of parole board
work. Put another way, the analysis should suggest something of the adaptive
character of legal decision-making, for such decisions may be shaped both
in response to particular decisions made earlier in the process and in
anticipation of ones which might be made subsequently.
One of the major tasks for those interested in legal decision-making is
to understand why and in what circumstances decision-makers accord changing priority to competing decision frames. This is a massive task, however,
because it requires close and careful investigation of the fundamental decision
model employed by legal decision-makers. It means, to begin with, lengthy
and detailed exploration of the jungle.

164. The quotations are from correspondence between the warden and the then chairman
of the Hamilton board.

